Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

O.C.G.A. 9-11-67.1 is a new Georgia statute governing settlement offers for personal injury and death claims arising from motor vehicle accidents. This case arises from an automobile accident involving the Dempseys and the Woodards, in which Thomas Dempsey was at fault. The court found it necessary to certify questions of Georgia law to the Georgia Supreme Court concerning the interpretation of section 9-11-67.1. The court certified the following questions: 1) Under Georgia law and the facts of this case, did the parties enter a binding settlement agreement when Insurer Grange accepted the Woodards' offer in writing? 2) Under Georgia law, does O.C.G.A. 9-11-67.1 permit unilateral contracts whereby offererors may demand acceptance in the form of performance before there is a binding, enforceable settlement contract? 3) Under Georgia law and the facts of the case, did O.C.G.A. 9-11-67.1 permit the Woodards to demand timely payment as a condition of accepting their offer? 4) Under Georgia law and the facts of this case, if there was a binding settlement agreement, did Insurer Grange breach that agreement as to payment, and what is the remedy under Georgia law? View "Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Woodard" on Justia Law

Defendants, three excess liability insurers, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to plaintiffs on their breach of contract claims. The district court concluded that Georgia's uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM) statute imposed upon defendants an unconditional obligation to provide UM coverage to the insured as if they were primary insurers, and that defendants' failure to tender payment amounted to a breach of contract. The court held that Georgia's UM statute, Ga. Code Ann. 33-7-11, applies to defendants' excess liability policies; defendants' excess liability policies contain vertical exhaustion requirements; and section 33-7-11 does not supersede the vertical exhaustion requirements in defendants' excess liability policies. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Coker v. American Guarantee and Liability Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The court originally remanded this case to the district court for additional fact-finding to establish complete diversity of citizenship between all plaintiffs and all defendants with instructions to reenter summary judgment if federal subject-matter jurisdiction could be properly established. After dismissing a nondiverse plaintiff it found was not a real party in interest to this case, the district court reentered its earlier grant of summary judgment in favor of the insurer on all claims. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of PMI Delaware and its grant of summary judgment to Lexington. The court concluded that the district court's dismissal of PMI Delaware pursuant to FRCP 21 as a "nominal or formal party" was proper because the district court found that though PMI Delaware was a named insured on the Insurance Policy, PMI Delaware would not be entitled to any portion of a successful judgment against Lexington because PMI Florida, not PMI Delaware, was the party against whom Blue Cross had filed suit and PMI Florida, not PMI Delaware, was the only party that made a claim for coverage to Lexington. Further, PMI Delaware was not even a party to the underlying Blue Cross contract, which provided healthcare coverage only to PMI Florida’s leased employees. Further, the court affirmed the district court's holding that Lexington owed no coverage to PMI Florida. Here, the court saw no contractual ambiguity; the Insurance Policy issued by Lexington explicitly excludes the coverage sought by PMI Florida. Therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment to Lexington on PMI Florida’s claims for breach of contract and declaratory judgment. Finally, the district court properly granted summary judgment to Lexington on its claim of negligent misrepresentation where no jury could reasonably find that Yoohoo justifiably relied on the statement at issue as an indication that there would be coverage under the policy. View "Payroll Mgmt., Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a purported class action challenging their insurer's interpretation of Fla. Stat. 627.736(1)(a)(3)–(4). In consolidated appeals, plaintiffs presented the issue of what the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law, Fla. Stat. 627.730–627.7405, places on an insured’s personal injury protection (PIP) benefits where no medical provider has made any determination about whether the insured’s injury was an emergency medical condition. The legislative history clearly shows that the Florida legislature sought to reduce fraudulent claims by making the full $10,000 amount of benefits available only to those insureds who suffered severe injuries, a restriction defined into the term “emergency medical condition.” The court held that Fla. Stat. 627.736, as amended, limits an insurer’s obligation to provide personal injury protection benefits to $2,500, unless one of the medical providers listed in subparagraph (1)(a)(3) has determined that the injured person had an emergency medical condition. Because neither plaintiffs' claim was supported by such a determination, neither insurer violated Fla. Stat. 627.736 by limiting benefits to $2,500. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the suits. View "Robbins v. Garrison Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against 21st Century, alleging that the insurance company acted in bad faith towards its insured. The district court granted judgment in favor of 21st Century. The court held that an insurer owes no duty under Florida law to enter into a so-called Cunningham agreement and likewise owes no duty to its insured to enter into a consent judgment in excess of the limits of its policy. In this case, the district court correctly precluded plaintiffs from introducing evidence of a settlement opportunity letter in support of their bad-faith claim. The court further concluded that this is true whether the court applies the de novo standard of review advocated by plaintiffs or the abuse-of-discretion standard asserted by 21st Century. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Kropilak v. 21st Century Ins. Co." on Justia Law