Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

A veteran who suffered a traumatic brain injury from an improvised explosive device while deployed sought financial assistance under the Traumatic Servicemembers’ Group Life Insurance (TSGLI) program after experiencing a stroke within two years of the injury. The Army denied his claim, determining the stroke was a physical illness or disease, not a qualifying traumatic injury as defined by the relevant statute and regulations. The veteran then petitioned the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to amend its rules to include coverage for illnesses or diseases caused by explosive ordnance, arguing these conditions are analogous to those already covered under existing exceptions for injuries resulting from chemical, biological, or radiological weapons.The VA initially denied the rulemaking petition but agreed to further review as part of a program-wide assessment. After several years, extensive consultation with medical experts, and consideration of the petition and supporting materials, the VA issued a final denial. It concluded that expanding coverage to delayed illnesses or diseases linked to explosive ordnance would be inconsistent with TSGLI’s purpose, which focuses on immediate injuries, would deviate from the insurance model underlying the program, and could threaten its financial stability. The VA also found insufficient evidence of a direct causal relationship between explosive ordnance, traumatic brain injury, and downstream illnesses like stroke.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the VA’s denial under the highly deferential “arbitrary and capricious” standard of the Administrative Procedure Act. The court held that the VA provided a reasoned explanation addressing the petitioner’s arguments and the record, and did not act arbitrarily or capriciously. The petition for review was therefore denied. View "MCKINNEY v. SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS " on Justia Law

AHAC, a surety, secured importers’ importation of preserved mushrooms and crawfish tail meat from China by issuing single transaction and continuous entry bonds in 2001 and 2002. The bonds obligated the importers and AHAC to pay, up to the face amounts of the bonds, “any duty, tax or charge and compliance with law or regulations” resulting from covered activities. Customs liquidated entries secured by the bonds and assessed antidumping duties, which the importers failed to pay. Customs started charging statutory post-liquidation interest on the unpaid duties, 19 U.S.C. 1505(d). From 2003-2009, Customs issued multiple demands notifying AHAC of its intent to seek section 1505(d) interest. Customs denied AHAC’s protest. AHAC did not challenge that denial under 28 U.S.C. 1581(a). The government commenced Trade Court suits. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Trade Court’s order that AHAC pay section 1505(d) interest up to the face amounts of the bonds. Section 1505(d) interest involves “charges or exactions of whatever character” under 19 U.S.C. 1514(a)(3); the statute does not exempt charges arising after liquidation. The bonds do not distinguish between pre- and post-liquidation interest. Because AHAC failed to contest its denied protest, AHAC was precluded from asserting defenses regarding its liability under section 1505(d). View "United States v. American Home Assurance Co." on Justia Law

USF&G filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1491(a)(1), seeking reimbursement from the government for legal expenses and settlement costs it allegedly incurred in its capacity as general liability insurer for Gibbs Construction, a government contractor. USF&G alleged that, in a contract for renovation work at the New Orleans main post office, the U.S. Postal Service agreed to indemnify Gibbs and its agents against any liability incurred as a result of asbestos removal work under the contract. USF&G alleged that the Postal Service failed to indemnify Gibbs in connection with a lawsuit filed against Gibbs by a former Postal Service police officer, in which the officer claimed that he contracted mesothelioma as a result of asbestos removal during performance of the contract, and that, as Gibbs’s general liability insurer, it was required to litigate and settle the officer’s claim. The Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal. The Claims Court lacked jurisdiction under a theory of equitable subrogation. View "Fid. & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law