Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

Thermoflex Waukegan, a company that required its hourly workers to use handprints to clock in and out, was sued for allegedly violating the Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA) by not obtaining workers' written consent and using a third party to process the data. Thermoflex had multiple insurance policies, including three from Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance, which declined to defend or indemnify Thermoflex, leading to this suit.The district court ruled that an exclusion in the Basic policy made it inapplicable to any claim based on BIPA. The exclusion stated that the insurance did not apply to claims arising out of any access to or disclosure of any person’s or organization’s confidential or personal information. The court found this exclusion straightforward, as BIPA identifies biometric information as confidential.The Excess and Umbrella policy had two parts. Coverage E contained the same exclusions as the Basic policy, and the court agreed with the district court's ruling that it did not apply to claims under BIPA. Coverage U lacked an exclusion relating to nonpublic information. The district court found that none of the three arguably applicable exclusions to Coverage U clearly foreclosed a duty to provide Thermoflex with a defense in the state-court suit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. It agreed with the district court's interpretation of the Basic policy and Coverage E of the Excess and Umbrella policy. It also agreed that the three exclusions to Coverage U did not apply to BIPA. Therefore, it held that Mitsui owed Thermoflex a defense under the Umbrella policy, provided that the limits of another policy that applies to the BIPA claims, plus deductibles, have been exhausted. View "Thermoflex Waukegan, LLC v. Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance USA, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves Maria and Jose Jimenez, who were involved in an auto accident with Stephen Kiefer. After the accident, the Jimenezes requested $100,000 from Kiefer's auto insurer, Travelers Commercial Insurance Company, to settle their claim against Kiefer. Travelers refused the offer, leading the Jimenezes to sue Kiefer in Illinois court. The Jimenezes and Kiefer entered into an agreement where Kiefer stipulated to a judgment against himself and assigned his rights and claims against Travelers to the Jimenezes. In exchange, the Jimenezes agreed not to execute the judgment against Kiefer personally. The Jimenezes then initiated a citation proceeding against Travelers, seeking to discover whether it held any of Kiefer’s assets.Travelers removed the action to federal court and filed for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment for Travelers, finding that Kiefer and the Jimenezes (as his assignees) were entitled to nothing under the insurance policy and had no claim for breach of any duties Travelers owed Kiefer. The Jimenezes appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the citation proceeding was an independent, removable action. It also agreed with the district court that the Jimenezes, as Kiefer’s assignees, could not recover under the policy in light of the legally responsible provision. The court concluded that Travelers could hold Kiefer to the terms of the policy, and under a strict construction of those terms, Kiefer was not legally responsible for the judgment because the covenant not to execute precluded its enforcement. Therefore, the legally responsible provision bars the Jimenezes’ recovery as Kiefer’s assignees. View "Jimenez v. Travelers Commercial Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Donald Artz, an electric distribution controller at WEC Energy Group, retired due to multiple sclerosis (MS) and sought long-term disability benefits from a plan administered by Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company. Hartford denied his claim, asserting that Artz was not "disabled" within the plan's definition. Artz filed a lawsuit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, alleging that Hartford's disability determination was arbitrary and capricious because it misconstrued the plan's terms and failed to provide a reasonable explanation for its decision.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. The district court upheld the denial of benefits at summary judgment, concluding that Artz had placed too much emphasis on the duties of his specific position at WEC rather than the "essential duties" of his job in the general workplace as required by the company’s plan. The court also underscored the independent medical reviews commissioned by Hartford and found the medical evidence supported the conclusion that Artz’s MS did not prevent him from working a standard 40-hour week as a power-distribution engineer.The case was then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, finding that Hartford had communicated rational reasons for its decision based on a fair reading of the plan and Artz’s medical records. The court concluded that the plan administrator provided sufficient process and that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act requires no more. The court noted that while Artz's condition was serious, the evidence did not show that the severity and persistency of his symptoms resulted in functional impairment as defined by the policy. View "Artz v. Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Company" on Justia Law

In 2003, the City of Chicago contracted with Walsh Construction Company to manage the construction of a canopy and curtain wall system at O’Hare International Airport. Walsh subcontracted with LB Steel, LLC to fabricate and install steel columns to support the wall and canopy. Several years into the project, the City discovered cracks in the welds of the steel columns and sued Walsh for breaching its contract. Walsh, in turn, sued LB Steel under its subcontract. Walsh also asked LB Steel’s insurers to defend it in the City’s lawsuit, but they never did. Walsh eventually secured a judgment against LB Steel, which led it to declare bankruptcy. Walsh then sued LB Steel’s insurers to recover the costs of defending against the City’s suit and indemnification for any resulting losses.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff insurers on both issues. The court reasoned that, because the physical damage at issue was limited to LB Steel’s own products, it did not constitute “property damage” as that term appears in the policies, thereby precluding coverage. As for the duty to defend, the court determined that the Insurers had none, because the City’s underlying claims did not implicate potential coverage under LB Steel’s policies.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court concluded that the defects in the welds and columns do not constitute “property damage” under LB Steel’s commercial general liability (CGL) policies. The court also found that the insurers had no duty to defend Walsh in the City’s underlying suit. The court further affirmed the district court's denial of Walsh’s request for sanctions under § 155. View "St. Paul Guardian Insurance Company v. Walsh Construction Company" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a patient, Tommy Harris, who contracted bacterial sepsis due to repeated infections from his dialysis treatment at a clinic in Belleville, Illinois. Harris filed a malpractice lawsuit against the operators of the clinic and later included a claim against Durham Enterprises, Inc., the janitorial company responsible for cleaning the facility. The case primarily concerns Durham’s insurance coverage. Durham submitted the lawsuit to Ohio Security Insurance Company, its insurer, which denied coverage based on the insurance policy’s exclusion for injuries caused by fungi or bacteria. Harris and Durham then negotiated an agreement in which Durham promised not to mount a defense and Harris promised to seek recovery only from the insurer. The state trial judge granted a motion to sever Harris's claim against Durham and set it for a bench trial. The judge held a short, uncontested bench trial and entered judgment against Durham for more than $2 million.Ohio Security was not a party to the state court proceedings and the insurance policy was not in the record. However, the consent judgment includes findings on insurance issues, notably, that the insurer breached its duty to defend and is estopped from asserting any policy defenses. After the judgment became final, Harris filed an amended complaint purporting to add Ohio Security as a defendant. Ohio Security removed the action to federal court and sought a declaration of its coverage obligations. The district court held that the bacteria exclusion precludes coverage.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Harris and Durham jointly appealed, challenging the no-coverage ruling but also raising a belated challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. The court found the jurisdictional argument meritless, as the Rooker–Feldman doctrine does not block federal jurisdiction over claims by nonparties to state-court judgments. The court also affirmed the district court's ruling that the policy’s bacteria exclusion precludes coverage for this loss. View "Mitchell v. Durham Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between Zhen Feng Lin, a food delivery driver who was severely injured in a car accident, and his employer's insurance company, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company. After the accident, Lin received a settlement from the at-fault driver's insurance company, and workers' compensation benefits from his employer's insurance carrier, Hartford Fire Insurance Company. Lin later sought additional recovery under his employer's underinsured motorist policy with Hartford Accident.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that Lin and Hartford Accident had not entered into a "settlement agreement" as defined by the insurance policy. As a result, the court ruled that the policy limits should be reduced by the amount Lin received in workers' compensation benefits. The court also agreed with the district court that Lin should be credited for the amount he paid to settle the workers' compensation lien.Additionally, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Lin's counterclaims for bad faith and breach of contract. The court found no plausible claim supporting the argument that Hartford Accident unreasonably delayed settling Lin's claim. Lin's request for statutory penalties for Hartford Accident's purported delay in handling his claim was also denied.Finally, the court denied both parties' motions for sanctions. Lin's appeal was deemed frivolous in part, but the court exercised its discretion not to impose sanctions. View "Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company v. Lin" on Justia Law

Margrit Meier, owner of a restaurant called Hartland Inn, filed a coverage request with Wadena Insurance Company after a fire destroyed her business. The policy entitled her to the "actual cash value" of the property at the time of the fire, but the parties disagreed on how to calculate this. Wadena initially paid Meier $775,000, using a method called the "Broad Evidence Rule" to calculate actual cash value. Dissatisfied, Meier hired a third-party adjuster, who estimated a higher value. Wadena then increased its estimate and paid an additional $60,135.79. Still unsatisfied, Meier invoked the policy’s panel appraisal option.The appraisal process was completed, and the umpire arrived at an independent estimate of the building’s actual cash value. However, Meier filed a second lawsuit, alleging breach of contract and bad faith, and sought to set aside the appraisal award as invalid under state law. The district court dismissed the action, observing that Wadena complied with the alternative dispute resolution process and paid out the binding award.The United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, stating there was no breach of contract or bad faith on Wadena's part. The court upheld that the Broad Evidence Rule was correctly applied to calculate the actual cash value of the property. The court also affirmed the district court’s denial of Wadena’s motion for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. View "Meier v. Wadena Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Aluminum Recovery Technologies (ART) operates a smelter and during a renovation, one of its furnaces failed, causing molten aluminum to escape and damage the plant and the furnace itself. The insurance company, ACE American Insurance, paid for some of the damages but not the cost of replacing the furnace's refractory. ART sued ACE, arguing that an explosion in the furnace caused the damage and thus, the insurance company should cover the refractory replacement costs. However, the insurer argued that the policy specifically excludes coverage for any damage to the refractory lining unless it directly results from specific perils such as fire, lightning, windstorm, hail, or explosion. The United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in favor of ACE. The court held that the explosion did not necessarily cause the leak, and ART failed to provide engineering evidence to support its claims. Additionally, the court found that ART had consented to the investigation protocol proposed by the insurer's experts, which involved destructive testing that led to the need for the refractory's replacement. Therefore, the insurer was not responsible for the additional expenses incurred due to the replacement of the refractory lining. View "Aluminum Recovery Technologies, Inc. v. Ace American Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In this case heard in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, an accident occurred at a construction site which resulted in bodily injuries to Gaylon Cruse and Mark Duckworth. During the installation of roof trusses, a power crane operated by Douglas Forrest was prematurely released, causing a truss to fall and collapse onto other trusses, injuring Cruse and Duckworth. Southern Truss, the owner of the truck to which the crane was attached, had two insurance policies - a commercial auto policy from Artisan and Truckers Casualty Company (Artisan) and a commercial general liability policy from The Burlington Insurance Company (Burlington). Both insurance companies denied a duty to defend in the underlying lawsuit initiated by Cruse and Duckworth.Artisan filed a suit in federal court seeking a declaration that it owed no duty to defend under its auto policy due to an operations exclusion clause and that Burlington owed a duty to defend. The district court denied both companies' motions for judgment, finding an ambiguity in Artisan's policy that should be construed in favor of the insured and that Burlington had a duty to defend some claims not covered by Artisan's policy. Both Artisan and Burlington appealed.The appeals court, applying Illinois law and conducting a de novo review, found no ambiguity in Artisan's policy. The court concluded that the operations exclusion applied because the injuries arose from the operation of the crane attached to the truck, whose primary purpose was to provide mobility to the crane. As such, Artisan had no duty to defend. Since Artisan had no duty to defend, the court determined that Burlington did have a duty to defend under its policy. Thus, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the district court. View "Artisan and Truckers Casualty Company v. Burlington Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Venequip, a Venezuelan heavy-equipment supplier, sold and serviced products made by Illinois-based Caterpillar. Venequip’s dealership was governed by sales and service agreements with CAT Sàrl, Caterpillar’s Swiss subsidiary. In 2019 CAT Sàrl terminated the dealership. The contracts contain clauses that direct all disputes to Swiss courts for resolution under Swiss law. In 2021 Venequip brought contract claims against CAT Sàrl in Geneva, Switzerland. Venequip filed applications across the United States seeking discovery from Caterpillar and its employees, dealers, and customers under 28 U.S.C. 1782(a), which authorizes (but does not require) district courts to order any person who resides or is found in the district to give testimony or produce documents “for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.” Venequip’s Northern District of Illinois application sought wide-ranging discovery from Caterpillar.Ruling on Venequip’s application, the district judge addressed four factors identified by the Supreme Court (Intel) that generally concern the applicant’s need for discovery, the intrusiveness of the request, and comity considerations, and added the parties’ contractual choice of forum and law and Caterpillar’s agreement to provide discovery in the Swiss court, then denied the application. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The appeal was not mooted by intervening developments in the Swiss court. The judge appropriately weighed the Intel factors and other permissible considerations. View "Venequip, S.A. v. Caterpillar Inc." on Justia Law