Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

Debra Jarvis was driving a bus owned by Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. when she experienced a sudden and unforeseeable loss of consciousness. Her loss of consciousness caused the bus to roll over, injuring several passengers. Some of the injured passengers filed separate lawsuits in a Utah court seeking damages. Two of the plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment, asserting that Lancer Insurance Co., Lake Shore’s insurer, was strictly liable for the passengers’ injuries under Utah Code 31A-22-303(1). The motions were denied. Lancer Insurance filed a separate federal case seeking a declaratory judgment confirming the state district court’s interpretation of Utah Code section 31A-22-303(1), thus reinforcing the conclusion that this provision preserves the common-law “sudden incapacity” defense and requires proof of fault to sustain liability. The federal district court certified two questions to the Supreme Court regarding the proper interpretation of section 31A-22-303(1). The Supreme Court answered (1) section 31A-22-303(1) overrules the common-law doctrine of sudden incapacity in a manner imposing strict liability on a driver (and her insurer); and (2) a driver (and her insurer) is subject to liability only up to the amount of the insurance coverage available under an applicable policy. View "Lancer Insurance Co. v. Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines, Inc." on Justia Law

Natalie Heslop overdosed on prescription drugs. The next day, Natalie rolled her truck down an embankment. Natalie informed the responding police officer, medical personnel, her family, and an insurance adjuster that the accident had been a suicide attempt. Natalie’s insurance policy provided that it would exclude coverage to any injured person “if the person’s conduct contributed to his injury…by intentionally causing injury to himself.” Natalie and her husband, Brandon Heslop, attempted to collect from Bear River Mutual Insurance Company under both a personal injury protection claim for Natalie’s personal injuries and a property damage claim for damage to the truck. Bear River denied the claims based on Natalie's admission that she intended to drive down the embankment. The Heslops subsequently filed a complaint against Bear River. The district court granted summary judgment to Bear River as to both the personal injury claim and the property damage claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on the Heslops’ claims. View "Heslop v. Bear River Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was (1) how Utah Code 30-3-5(1)(e) should be interpreted in correlation with Utah Code 75-2-804, and (2) the proper interpretation of “express terms” in section 75-2-804(2). Tyler Hertzske and Linda Snyder each claimed sole entitlement to the death benefits of a life insurance policy held by Edward Hertzske, deceased. The district court granted summary judgment to Tyler, concluding that Tyler was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In so holding, the judge concluded (1) where section 30-3-5(1)(e) was not considered or included in the divorce proceedings, it did not apply, and (2) the Policy did not contain “express terms” that would except it from revocation under section 75-2-804(2). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 75-2-804(2) creates a rebuttable presumption that a beneficiary designation in a life insurance policy is revoked upon divorce; (2) section 30-3-5(1)(e) does not apply in this instance, and, rather, section 75-2-804 governs; (3) a life insurance policy must contain “express terms” referring to divorce in order for the beneficiary designation of a former spouse to survive revocation by section 75-2-804(2); and (4) the Policy did not contain “express terms” that would except it from revocation under section 75-2-804(2). View "Snyder v. Hertzske" on Justia Law

Barbara Bagley and Vom Baur, her common law husband, were traveling in a Range Rover when Bagley lost control of the vehicle and flipped it. Ten days later, Baur died from the injuries he sustained in the accident. Bagley, in her capacity as sole heir and personal representative of her deceased husband’s estate, brought suit against herself as an individual, alleging that she negligently caused her husband’s death. Bagley, who sued under Utah’s wrongful death and survival action statutes, brought suit to compel State Farm Insurance Company, with whom she maintained a motor vehicle insurance policy, to indemnify her. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluded that a person cannot simultaneously act as plaintiff and defendant in a wrongful death or survival action suit. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err when it concluded that the wrongful death and survival action statutes permit a person acting in the legal capacity of an heir or personal representative to sue herself in an individual capacity for negligently causing a decedent’s death or injury. View "Bagley v. Bagley" on Justia Law

After Larry Sewell fell into a service pit at Xpress Lube, Sewell filed suit against Xpress Lube. A process server left copies of the summons and complaint with an Xpress Lube employee. Bruce Anderson, the sole proprietor of Xpress Lube, later found the summons and complaint and sent them to his insurance agent, who, in turn, attempted to fax the complaint to Travelers Insurance, Anderson's insurance carrier. Travelers, however, never received the fax. Sewell later filed a motion for default judgment. The district court granted the motion and entered judgment against Xpress Lube. The Supreme Court vacated the default judgment, holding (1) there was no proper service on Xpress Lube because the sole proprietor was not served in this case, and therefore, the default judgment was void for lack of jurisdiction; (2) the district court erred in failing to vacate the default judgment due to mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect; and (3) the district court erred when it failed to hold an evidentiary hearing on unliquidated damages. View "Sewell v. Xpress Lube" on Justia Law

Petitioner was traveling home from work in his personal vehicle when he sustained back injuries in a car accident. Petitioner applied for workers' compensation benefits, but his application was denied under the "going and coming rule," which deems injuries occurring during a work commute outside the course of employment and thus not compensable. Petitioner appealed, arguing that in light of the benefits his employer received through various work-related uses of his vehicle, he was "in the course of employment" during the accident. The labor commission and court of appeals rejected Petitioner's claim that he qualified under the "instrumentality" exception of the going and coming rule. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner fell within the rule and not the exception. View "Jex v. Utah Labor Comm'n" on Justia Law

Basic Research, LLC marketed the weight-loss product Akavar. Customers who purchased Akavar filed lawsuits against Basic Research claiming false advertising, defective product, and failure to perform as promised. Basic Research was insured by Admiral Insurance under a policy that provided coverage for "personal and advertising injury." After the underlying claims were filed, Basic Research invoked its coverage and asked Admiral to defend it. Admiral refused to defend, alleging that the underlying claims were not covered by the terms of the policy. Thereafter, Basic Research brought this suit for declaratory relief. The district court granted Admiral's motion for summary judgment, finding that the underlying claims were specifically excluded from coverage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the asserted claims were not covered by the policy and were in fact squarely excluded by its terms; and (2) therefore, Admiral had no duty to defend Basic Research. View "Basic Research, LLC v. Admiral Ins. Co." on Justia Law

An industrial accident occurred while Employer was insured under two separate workers compensation insurance policies, one with the Workers Compensation Fund (WCF) and one with the Utah Business Insurance Company (UBIC). WCF paid all of Employee's medical expenses and weekly compensation benefits, but when WCF became aware of the overlapping coverage, WCF filed a complaint against UBIC, alleging that UBIC was either solely or jointly liable for Employee's insurance benefits. The district court granted WCF's motion for partial summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that both insurers were liable for Employee's claim, and therefore, WCF was entitled to equitable contribution from UBIC for reasonable past and future costs associated with the claim. Remanded for resolution for the remaining claims. View "Workers Comp. Fund v. Utah Bus. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Chad Jones sued his insurance company, Farmers Insurance Exchange, for breach of contract, bad faith breach of contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress after Farmers denied his claim. Farmers defended by arguing that it did not breach its contract because Jones's claim was "fairly debatable." Farmers claimed this defense must be resolved through summary judgment. The district court granted Farmers' motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the fairly-debatable defense should not be resolved through summary judgment if reasonable minds could differ as to whether the defendant's conduct measures up to the standard required for insurance claim investigations. Remanded. View "Jones v. Farmers Ins. Exch." on Justia Law

Plaintiff's son, Hayden, was involved in a near-drowning accident in which he suffered severe permanent injuries. Plaintiff subsequently sought coverage for the cost of his treatment from Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance, under which Hayden was insured. Wasatch Crest was later declared insolvent, and Plaintiff filed a claim against the Wasatch Crest estate. The liquidator of the estate denied Plaintiff's claim, concluding that Wasatch Crest had properly terminated coverage under the language of the plan. The Supreme Court reversed, interpreting the plan in favor of coverage. Plaintiff resubmitted her claim for medical expenses to the liquidator for payment under the Utah Insurers Rehabilitation and Liquidation Act. One year later, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment with the district court. The liquidator subsequently issued a second amended notice of determination denying Plaintiff's claim on the merits. The district court then denied Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, as Plaintiff had not yet challenged the second amended notice of determination and could do so under the Liquidation Act. Plaintiff appealed the district court's order. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal because Plaintiff did not appeal from a final judgment and had not satisfied any of the exceptions to the final judgment rule.