Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

As the primary beneficiary under an insurance policy issued by Appellee Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company, Appellant Roger Goff brought a cause of action under the West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act, asserting that Penn Mutual had violated the statutory duty of good faith and fair dealing. After deciding that Goff did not meet the accepted definition of either a first- or a third-party bad faith claimant, the trial court dismissed Goff's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a primary life insurance beneficiary may assert a statutory bad faith action upon the death of the insured. Remanded. View "Goff v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Kyle Hoffman was a passenger in an automobile driven by William Piper (William) when an accident resulted in the deaths of Hoffman and William. Robin Prinz, administratrix of the estate of Kyle Hoffman, filed a complaint asserting a wrongful death claim against Julie Piper (Petitioner), administratrix of the estate of William, and a declaratory judgment claim against State Farm. The complaint alleged that William's grandfather maintained a personal liability policy through State Farm that provided coverage to William. The circuit court bifurcated the two claims and stayed the wrongful death action pending resolution of the declaratory judgment action. The circuit court found the State Farm policy provided liability coverage for the allegedly negligent actions of William. State Farm appealed. Petitioner filed a motion to stay the wrongful death action pending the Court's resolution of State Farm's appeal, which the circuit court denied. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from enforcing its order denying the stay. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) the court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to further stay the wrongful death proceedings; and (2) a writ of prohibition is not available to correct discretionary rulings.

Employee submitted a claim for workers' compensation under Employer's policy with Insurer, which claim was paid in full. Employee also filed a deliberate intent lawsuit against Employer. After assuming the attorney's fees and costs associated with defending and settling the action, Employer filed a complaint against Insurer, alleging various claims related to Insurer's denial of coverage in the defense of the deliberate intent action. The circuit court granted Employer's motion for partial summary judgment on its bad faith claim against Insurer and awarded damages to Employer. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Insurer met its obligation under W. Va. Code 23-4C-6 to make deliberate intent coverage available to Employer upon the Employer's voluntary request; and (2) because the language of the policy was plain, and the exclusion of deliberate intent coverage was clear, the circuit court erred in concluding that the policy was ambiguous and therefore resulted in deliberate intent coverage being included in the policy under the doctrine of reasonable expectations.

The executor of the estates of a family who were killed in an accident filed a wrongful death action against an individual and trucking company. The trucking company was bankrupt, but insurance coverage for the accident was available through a policy issued to the company by Converium. Converium subsequently entered into an agreement with National Indemnity Company, which agreed to purchase all or certain portions of Converium. No representation of National Indemnity appeared at the court-ordered mediation. National Indemnity's vice president and legal counsel, Joseph Casaccio, failed to appear at the second mediation but appeared at the third mediation. The case was eventually settled. The circuit court subsequently imposed monetary sanctions against Petitioners, National Indemnity and Casaccio, for failing, without good cause, to appear at the mediation. The Supreme Court reversed the order imposing sanctions, holding (1) W.V. Trial Ct. R. 25.10 did authorize a trial court to sanction Petitioners, but (2) no sanctionable conduct occurred in this case.