Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

From 2007 to 2009, a number of lawsuits involving Plaintiff, the trustee of two trusts, were filed throughout the country. Plaintiff asked his professional liability insurer, Houston Casualty Company, to defend him in the lawsuits. Houston Casualty determined that it had no obligation to either defend or indemnify Plaintiff in connection with any of the lawsuits. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Houston Casualty alleging, inter alia, breach of the duty to defend and bad faith. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Houston Casualty, concluding that the insurer had not breached its duty to defend Plaintiff. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the complaints and counterclaim against Plaintiff did not allege facts which, if proven, would constitute claims covered under the policy Houston Casualty issued to Plaintiff, and therefore, Houston Casualty did not breach its duty when it refused to defend Plaintiff in the lawsuits at issue. View "Marks v. Houston Cas. Co." on Justia Law

The complex insurance coverage dispute arose out of a 2007 fire that destroyed portions of a home that was still under construction. Fontana Builders, Inc., the construction contractor, and James and Suzy Accola, the occupants/presumptive purchasers, had separate insurance policies. The Accolas settled with Chubb Insurance Co., the insurer that provided their homeowner’s policy. Assurance Company of America, which had issued a builder’s risk policy to Fontana, denied all coverage for the fire. Fontana commenced this action against Assurance alleging breach of the insurance contract and bad faith failure to pay under the policy. Fontana’s lender, AnchorBank, FSB, eventually intervened. After a retrial, the jury found that the Assurance policy did not provide coverage for Fontana’s fire loss, concluding that the Chubb policy “applied” to the underlying facts so as to terminate Fontana’s builder’s risk coverage. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that that the homeowner’s policy issued by Chubb to the Accolas did not apply so as to terminate Fontana’s builder’s risk policy from Assurance. Remanded. View "Fontana Builders, Inc. v. Assurance Co. of Am." on Justia Law

Kenneth Burgraff was injured when an employee of Menard, Inc. loaded materials onto Burgraff’s trailer using a forklift. Burgraff sued Menard for damages. Burgraff’s vehicle and trailer were insured under a policy issued by Millers First Insurance Company. Millers First agreed to defend Menard under the policy as a permissive user of Burgraff’s vehicle. Menard was also insured for excess coverage under a commercial general liability policy that included a self-insured retention endorsement. Millers First eventually settled Burgraff’s claim for $40,000, after which Millers First withdrew its defense of Menard. The circuit court determined that Menard’s self-insured retention was “other applicable liability insurance” under the Millers First policy’s “other insurance” clause. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s determination that Menard’s self-insured retention was “other insurance” and reversed the circuit court’s determination that Menard no longer had a duty to defend. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the terms of the policy, Millers First was required to provide a defense for Menard until it paid its $100,000 limit of liability and breached its duty to defend when it withdrew its defense of Menard; and (2) Menard’s self-insured retention is “other insurance” under the Miller’s First policy’s “other insurance” clause. View "Burgraff v. Menard, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2009, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint against, among other defendants, First American Title Insurance Company, with whom Plaintiffs had a title insurance policy for their property, for failing to defend the title to their property. As part of the settlement between Plaintiffs and defendants John and Jane Stevenson, the Stevensons paid Plaintiffs for an assignment of their rights under the title insurance policy, including any claims against First American. The Stevensons subsequently filed a cross-claim against First American for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty and bad faith for refusing to defend the title to Plaintiffs’ lot. After a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Stevensons and awarded the Stevensons compensatory damages and $1,000,000 in punitive damages to punish First American’s bad faith. The circuit court allowed the bad faith finding and the punitive damages award to stand. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the punitive damages award in this case was excessive and deprived First American of its right to due process, and (2) the appropriate amount of punitive damages in this case was $210,000. View "Kimble v. Land Concepts, Inc." on Justia Law

John Zeverino owned a semi-tractor that was leased to Taylor Truck Line. In 2009, the tractor was involved in a multi-vehicle accident that occurred while Zeverino was on his way to a maintenance facility for repairs to the tractor. Acceptance Casualty Insurance Company and Great West Casualty Company both issued liability insurance policies for the semi-tractor. Acceptance provided a non-trucking use policy, and Great West provided a commercial truckers’ policy. Each insurer filed a motion for summary judgment asserting the other was responsible for coverage for the accident. The circuit court concluded that the Acceptance policy provided coverage. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Acceptance’s non-trucking use policy provided coverage for the accident, and neither of the two exclusions in Acceptance’s policy precluded coverage. View "Casey v. Smith" on Justia Law

Ronald Belding was injured in an accident with an uninsured driver. Belding and his wife had two policies with State Farm Automobile Insurance Company, which provided coverage for their two vehicles, a Ford Ranger, which was involved in the accident, and a Mercury Villager. State Farm paid the Beldings the maximum uninsured motorist coverage under the Ford Ranger policy, and the Beldings sought to collect excess damages through the uninsured motorist coverage in their Mercury Villager policy. The circuit court granted summary judgment for State Farm, concluding that a “drive-other-car exclusion” in the Mercury Villager policy precluded coverage. The court of appeals reversed, determining that Wis. Stat. 632.32(6)(d), which prohibited anti-stacking clauses, barred the drive-other-car exclusion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, pursuant to the prohibition on anti-stacking clauses in section 632.32(6)(d), State Farm could not use the drive-other-car exclusion in the Mercury Villager policy to prevent the Beldings from stacking the uninsured motorist coverage of up to three vehicles owned and insured by them. View "Belding v. Demoulin" on Justia Law

Defendant-sellers obtained a policy from American Family Mutual Insurance Company insuring an apartment building. When preparing for the sale of the building, Defendants signed a real estate condition report stating that they were not aware of the presence of asbestos on the premises. After Plaintiff-buyers purchased the building, their contractor discovered asbestos in the building. Plaintiffs filed an action against Defendants for breach of contract/warranty and negligence in failing to adequately disclose defective conditions. The circuit court held that American Family had no duty to defend or indemnify Defendants because an asbestos exclusion in the American Family policy precluded coverage. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the policy precluded coverage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the asbestos exclusion in the American Family policy precluded coverage for the losses alleged by Plaintiffs. View "Phillips v. Parmelee" on Justia Law

Defendant hosted an underage drinking party in which one of the guests known to become belligerent when intoxicated assaulted and seriously injured another guest. The victim sued Defendant and his insurer (Insurer) for damages for his injuries. Insurer disputed coverage, arguing that it had no duty to defend and indemnify Defendant because there was no "accident" or "occurrence" under Defendant's family's homeowner's insurance policy where Defendant's actions were intentional. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Insurer. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that there was an occurrence because the assault was an accident when viewed from the standpoint of the injured person or Defendant, the insured. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) viewed from the standpoint of a reasonable insured, Defendant's intentional actions in setting up a drinking party and procuring alcohol for underage guests, including one known to become belligerent when intoxicated, created a direct risk of harm resulting in bodily injury; and (2) thus, the victim's bodily injury was not caused by an "occurrence" within the meaning of the policy, and Insurer was not obligated to provide insurance coverage for Defendant. View "Schinner v. Gundrum" on Justia Law

After receiving a work-related injury during his employment by Employer, Employee applied for worker's compensation benefits. An ALJ ordered that further medical procedures were required to determine whether Employee was permanently and totally disabled, but the Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC) proceeded to award benefits to Employee for his permanent total disability. Employer filed a complaint seeking judicial review of LIRC's decision. The circuit court affirmed. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the circuit court was required to dismiss Employer's complaint for lack of competency based on Employer's failure to name its insurer (Insurer) as an "adverse party" pursuant to Wis. Stat. 102.23(1)(a). The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to affirm LIRC's decision, holding (1) the circuit court had competency to adjudicate Employer's complaint notwithstanding Employer's omission of Insurer because Insurer was not an "adverse party" for purposes of section 102.23(1)(a); and (2) LIRC did not exceed its authority in awarding Employee permanent total disability benefits, and its finding that Employee was entitled to benefits on an odd-lot basis was supported by credible and substantial evidence. View "Xcel Energy Servs., Inc. v. Labor & Ind. Review Comm'n " on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a claim with their insurer (Insurer) for underinsured motorist benefits after a car accident. Pursuant to a provision of the insurance policy, the parties submitted the dispute to an arbitration panel. Prior to the arbitration hearing, Insurer sought broad discovery under Wis. Stat. 804. Plaintiffs refused to comply with such discovery on the grounds that Wis. Stat. 788.07 controlled and permitted only the taking of certain depositions. The arbitration panel decided that Insurer was entitled to chapter 804 discovery. The circuit court reversed and directed that arbitration discovery would proceed as allowed by section 788.07. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Plaintiffs were not allowed to seek an interlocutory appeal, and that full chapter 804 discovery was available to Insurer. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) because no unusual circumstances justified an interlocutory appeal, Plaintiffs' action in the circuit court was premature; and (2) because Insurer failed to include an explicit, specific, and clearly drafted arbitration clause stating otherwise, discovery in this case was limited to that provided for in section 788.07. Remanded. View "Marlowe v. IDS Prop. Cas. Ins. Co." on Justia Law