Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

A fire erupted at a cannabidiol oil extraction factory, leased and operated by JDBC Holdings, Inc, d/b/a The CBD Factories (“JDBC”). JDBC filed a claim for insurance coverage with Kinsale Insurance Company (“Kinsale”)., Kinsale filed a suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia alleging that it was not bound to provide coverage. The district court denied Kinsale’s motion for summary judgment, granted in part JDBC’s motion for partial summary judgment, and declared that Kinsale was bound to provide coverage. The district court certified its Order as a final judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) and stayed JDBC’s counterclaims for breach of contract and bad faith pending appeal.The Fourth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal because the district court’s order was not a final decision. The court reasoned that though the district court resolved the key question of whether Kinsale was liable for providing coverage for the damage at the JDBC facility, “the order does not embody the essential elements of a money judgment because the court has not found all of the facts necessary to compute the amount of damages due.”Further, the court found that even if the district court’s order was a final judgment, the district court abused its discretion in concluding that there was no just reason for the delay to certify the partial summary judgment order for the court’s review. Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Kinsale Insurance Company v. JDBC Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part the decision of the district court granting summary judgment for Meritain Health, Inc., and dismissing David Peterson's claims against Meritain, holding that there were genuine issues of material fact as to some of Peterson's claims.Peterson, an insured under a hospital's health benefit plan, brought this action against the hospital and Meritain Health, Inc., the third-party administrator of the plan, alleging several claims arising from the denial of his claims for health insurance coverage. The district court granted Meritain's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case, holding that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding Peteron's breach of contract claim, his third-party beneficiary claim, and his claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. View "Peterson v. Meritain Health, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2000, governmental entities filed a class action against lead paint manufacturers. Following remand, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint alleging representative public nuisance on behalf of the People, claiming that the presence of lead in paint and coatings in and around California homes and buildings has created a massive public health crisis. The trial court found ConAgra, NL, and Sherwin-Williams jointly and severally liable and ordered the establishment of a fund for the abatement of lead paint in pre-1978 homes in the 10 jurisdictions represented in the case. Following another remand, after the California Supreme Court denied review and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari, the trial court recalculated the amount to be paid into the abatement fund as $401,122,482.Underwriters at Lloyd’s London and other insurers sought a determination that they had no coverage obligation to ConAgra. The trial court determined that ConAgra, as successor to paint manufacturer W.P. Fuller, was not entitled to indemnity from its insurers for its payment to the abatement fund due to Insurance Code section 533, which provides that insurers are not liable for losses caused by a willful act of the insured. The court of appeal affirmed. Fuller had actual knowledge of the harms associated with lead paint when it promoted lead paint for interior residential use, which establishes the willful act required to trigger section 533 prohibition against insurance coverage. View "Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London. v. Conagra Grocery Products Co." on Justia Law

DENC, Inc. ("DENC") sued Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company ("Philadelphia"), claiming breach of contract and violations of the North Carolina’s Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“UDTPA”) based on Philadelphia's refusal to cover DENC's claim for collapse damage. The district court found Philadelphia improperly denied coverage and therefore breached the terms of the insurance policy and violated the UDTPA. However, the district court declined to award treble damages because DENC didn’t show that Philadelphia’s UDTPA violation proximately caused any injury. Both parties appealed.The Fourth Circuit affirmed on all liability issues, finding that the district court did not err in applying the appropriate standards. However, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of treble damage to DENC, holding that the district court erred in assessing proximate cause under the UDTPA.Under N.C. Gen. Stat. Sec. 75-16, a court must award treble damages if a defendant violates the UDTPA. However, damages are limited to those proximately caused by the defendant's violation. Here, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court that Philadelphia's denial letter was deceptive; however, the district court erred when it engaged in a separate proximate cause analysis. The Fourth Circuit found that the denial letter was aggravating conduct that accompanied the breach, requiring treble damages. View "DENC, LLC v. Philadelphia Indemnity Ins." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs - Christine Brehm and Amber Hess - in these suits for declarations of coverage against Progressive Max Insurance Company, holding that the circuit court erred in its grant of summary judgment.Plaintiffs were passengers in a Toyota Camry, a rental vehicle operated by Susan Bindernagel, when another driver crashed into the Camry. Bindernagel's insurer, Progressive, denied underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage because the rental vehicle was not a "covered auto" under the policy. The circuit court found that because Plaintiffs had been Bindernagel's guest passengers in the rental car when the crash occurred they were entitled to UIM coverage. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that neither the clear statutory language nor the terms of the insurance policy specifically provided for UIM coverage to those in Plaintiffs' position. View "Progressive Max Insurance Co. v. Brehm" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court ruling that an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) was covered under a homeowner's insurance policy as a "farm type vehicle," holding that the circuit court erred.Diamond Jones was injured while riding as a passenger on the back of an ATV driven by the daughter of Jennifer and Richard Rekowski. Jones filed a negligence action against the Rekowskis, who were insured by a homeowner's policy issued by Erie Insurance Exchange, and then filed this action seeking a judgment that Erie was obligated to pay the insurance claim. The circuit court concluded that the policy covered the accident. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the ATV involved in the accident was not a "farm type" vehicle; and (2) therefore, the ATV was excluded from coverage by the homeowner's insurance policy. View "Erie Insurance Exchange v. Jones" on Justia Law

PCS Nitrogen sought insurance coverage for liability arising from contamination of a fertilizer manufacturing site in Charleston, South Carolina, claiming its right to coverage stemmed from an assignment of insurance benefits executed by Columbia Nitrogen Corporation in 1986. Respondents, the insurance carriers who issued the policies at issue, claimed they owed no coverage because Columbia Nitrogen Corporation executed the assignment without their consent. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Respondents, and the court of appeals affirmed. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted PCS's petition for a writ of certiorari, finding Columbia Nitrogen Corporation executed a valid post-loss assignment of insurance rights in 1986. "PCS cannot be denied coverage on the basis that Respondents did not consent to the assignment." The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "PCS Nitrogen, Inc. v Continental Casualty Company, et al." on Justia Law

BITCO General Insurance Corporation (“BITCO”) and Monroe Guaranty Insurance Company (“Monroe”) issued general liability insurance policies to 5D Drilling & Pump Service Inc. (“5D”). A property owner sued 5D for breach of contract and negligence. BITCO sought a declaratory judgment that Monroe also owed a duty to defend 5D.The parties dispute whether any “property damage” alleged could have occurred during Monroe’s policy period. The magistrate found that damage must have occurred during a period when Monroe’s policy was in force.The court reasoned that under Texas law, courts determine whether an insurer’s duty to defend has been triggered by using the “eight corners” rule. The party seeking coverage has the initial burden of establishing that the underlying claims potentially state a cause of action. When pleadings in the underlying lawsuit have been amended, the court analyzes the duty to defend by examining the “latest, and only the latest, amended pleadings.”Typically, the eight-corners rule prevents courts from considering any extrinsic evidence. Texas law recognizes a limited exception to the eight-corners rule when it is impossible to discern whether coverage is potentially implicated and when the extrinsic evidence goes solely to a fundamental issue of coverage.Monroe contends that even if the owner’s pleading alleges damage within its policy period, it still has no duty to defend because all the damage falls within policy exclusions. The court found that Monroe cannot carry its burden because it cannot show that either exception unambiguously applies. Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s order. View "BITCO Gen Ins v. Monroe Guar Ins" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative a certified question issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in this insurance dispute.At issue was Mont. Code Ann. 33-15-334(2), which provides that Mont. Code Ann. 33-15-337(2) is "not intended to increase the risk assumed under policies subject to" its requirements. Specifically in question was whether, when an insurance policy does not adhere to the technical requirements of Mont. Code Ann. 33-15-337(2), the insurer may nonetheless rely on unambiguous exclusions or limitations to the policy's coverage. The Supreme Court answered the question in the affirmative, concluding that, notwithstanding a failure to follow the provisions of section 33-15-337(2), an insurer may rely on unambiguous exclusions or limitations to the policy's coverage when invalidating such a provision would result in an increase of the risk assumed. View "High Country Paving, Inc. v. United Fire & Casualty Co." on Justia Law

In this insurance dispute, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in favor of Defendant following the denial of Plaintiff's request for declaratory judgment and the grant of Defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that Defendant was required to provide him with full insurance coverage and indemnification for his claims in his underlying personal injury lawsuit. The hearing justice granted summary judgment for Defendant as to all of Plaintiff's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff was not entitled to relief on his claims of error. View "Dulong v. Merrimack Mutual Fire Insurance Co." on Justia Law