Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

At issue in this appeal was whether claims in an underlying personal injury suit against two contractors were covered under policies issued by Amerisure, in which the contractors were additional insureds. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment that Amerisure improperly relied on a policy exclusion to avoid its duty to defend, and that Amerisure was liable under the terms of its policies to pay the full cost of the settlement plus prejudgment interest. The court vacated the district court's judgment with respect to defense fees and costs, and held that Amerisure was liable for the full amount of those fees and costs because Continental did not have an independent duty to defend in the underlying lawsuit. View "Continental Casualty Co. v. Amerisure Insurance Co." on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether claims in an underlying personal injury suit against two contractors were covered under policies issued by Amerisure, in which the contractors were additional insureds. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment that Amerisure improperly relied on a policy exclusion to avoid its duty to defend, and that Amerisure was liable under the terms of its policies to pay the full cost of the settlement plus prejudgment interest. The court vacated the district court's judgment with respect to defense fees and costs, and held that Amerisure was liable for the full amount of those fees and costs because Continental did not have an independent duty to defend in the underlying lawsuit. View "Continental Casualty Co. v. Amerisure Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Lincoln Benefit in a declaratory judgment action over an insurance policy. Considering sua sponte whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction, the panel held that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction; the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to strike plaintiff's expert report and plaintiff has not shown how an expert opinion could have been helpful in this case; there was no genuine dispute about whether plaintiff needed to pay certain sums to keep his policy from lapsing or whether Lincoln Benefit mailed the required notice at least 30 days before the policy lapsed; the policy was unambiguous and the district court's reading of the policy was proper; and because there was nothing to gain by deposing the Lincoln Benefit official most knowledgeable on policy lapses, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's request to delay consideration of the motion. View "Elhouty v. Lincoln Benefit Life Co." on Justia Law

At issue in this case involving long-tail insurance claims was whether, under the “pro rata time-on-the-risk” method of allocation, Century Indemnity Company was liable to its insured, KeySpan Gas East Corporation, for years outside of its policy periods when there was no applicable insurance coverage available on the market.KeySpan sought a declaration of coverage and determination of liability owed under the policies issued by Century. Supreme Court denied Century’s motion for partial summary judgment with respect to those years in which the relevant insurance coverage was otherwise unavailable in the marketplace. The Appellate Division reversed, determining that, under the applicable insurance policies, Century did not need to indemnify KeySpan for losses that were attributable to time periods when liability insurance was otherwise unavailable in the marketplace. The Court of Appeals affirmed, thereby rejecting application of the unavailability rule for time-on-the-risk pro rata allocation. View "Keyspan Gas East Corp. v Munich Reinsurance America, Inc." on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit held that the main questions at issue in this appeal —concerning both the scope and limit of the Insurers' duties to defend and indemnify WECCO—were answered over a decade ago in In re Wallace & Gale Co., 385 F.3d 820, 833–34 (4th Cir. 2004). The court denied WECCO's request to either consider these questions anew or certify them to the Maryland Court of Appeals. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment and rejected WECCO's challenges to the district court's interpretation of the completed-operations hazard to apply to bodily injury stemming from an individual's exposure to asbestos during a WECCO operation that was completed at the time the insurance policy took effect, regardless of whether such operation was ongoing when the individual was first exposed; decision to place the burden on WECCO to prove that an asbestos related bodily injury claim was not subject to a policy's aggregate limit; determination that St. Paul properly classified certain claims as "completed operations" claims; declaration that the aggregate limits of St. Paul's policies had been exhausted; and conclusion, in the alternative, that most of WECCO's breach-of-contract claims were time-barred. View "The Walter E. Campbell Co. v. United States Fire Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit held that the main questions at issue in this appeal —concerning both the scope and limit of the Insurers' duties to defend and indemnify WECCO—were answered over a decade ago in In re Wallace & Gale Co., 385 F.3d 820, 833–34 (4th Cir. 2004). The court denied WECCO's request to either consider these questions anew or certify them to the Maryland Court of Appeals. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment and rejected WECCO's challenges to the district court's interpretation of the completed-operations hazard to apply to bodily injury stemming from an individual's exposure to asbestos during a WECCO operation that was completed at the time the insurance policy took effect, regardless of whether such operation was ongoing when the individual was first exposed; decision to place the burden on WECCO to prove that an asbestos related bodily injury claim was not subject to a policy's aggregate limit; determination that St. Paul properly classified certain claims as "completed operations" claims; declaration that the aggregate limits of St. Paul's policies had been exhausted; and conclusion, in the alternative, that most of WECCO's breach-of-contract claims were time-barred. View "The Walter E. Campbell Co. v. United States Fire Insurance Co." on Justia Law

This appeal grew out of a dispute between an insured (Summit Park Townhome Association) and its insurer (Auto-Owners Insurance Company) over the value of property damaged in a hail storm. To determine the value, the district court ordered an appraisal and established procedural requirements governing the selection of impartial appraisers. After the appraisal was completed, Auto-Owners paid the appraised amount to Summit Park. But the court found that Summit Park had failed to make required disclosures and had selected a biased appraiser. In light of this finding, the court vacated the appraisal award, dismissed Summit Park’s counterclaims with prejudice, and awarded interest to Auto-Owners on the amount earlier paid to Summit Park. Summit Park appealed, but the Tenth Circuit affirmed. “In the absence of a successful appellate challenge to the disclosure order, Summit Park was obligated to comply and did not. The court was thus justified in dismissing Summit Park’s counterclaims. In addition, Summit Park’s failure to select an impartial appraiser compelled vacatur of the appraisal award under the insurance policy. Finally, Summit Park obtained due process through the opportunity to object to the award of interest.” View "Auto-Owners v. Summit Park" on Justia Law

This appeal grew out of a dispute between an insured (Summit Park Townhome Association) and its insurer (Auto-Owners Insurance Company) over the value of property damaged in a hail storm. To determine the value, the district court ordered an appraisal and established procedural requirements governing the selection of impartial appraisers. After the appraisal was completed, Auto-Owners paid the appraised amount to Summit Park. But the court found that Summit Park had failed to make required disclosures and had selected a biased appraiser. In light of this finding, the court vacated the appraisal award, dismissed Summit Park’s counterclaims with prejudice, and awarded interest to Auto-Owners on the amount earlier paid to Summit Park. Summit Park appealed, but the Tenth Circuit affirmed. “In the absence of a successful appellate challenge to the disclosure order, Summit Park was obligated to comply and did not. The court was thus justified in dismissing Summit Park’s counterclaims. In addition, Summit Park’s failure to select an impartial appraiser compelled vacatur of the appraisal award under the insurance policy. Finally, Summit Park obtained due process through the opportunity to object to the award of interest.” View "Auto-Owners v. Summit Park" on Justia Law

Baldwin Mutual Insurance Company ("Baldwin Mutual") appealed a circuit court’s class certification in a suit filed by Gloria McCain. McCain owned a house insured by Baldwin Mutual. The policy provided that any covered property losses would be settled “at actual cash value at the time of loss but not exceeding the amount necessary to repair or replace the damaged property.” McCain's house was damaged twice, she filed claims and was reimbursed by Baldwin Mutual. In each incident, an independent adjuster examined McCain's damaged property and prepared an estimate. Baldwin Mutual paid McCain's claim in accordance with the estimate prepared by the adjuster. The record contained no allegation or evidence indicating that McCain sought more money from Baldwin Mutual in connection with those claims or that she was unhappy in any way. Nevertheless, McCain’s complaint alleged Baldwin Mutual had wrongfully been reducing the amount paid on claims made on actual-cash-value policies inasmuch as its practice was to deduct some amount for depreciation not only of the damaged materials and the labor costs of initially installing those damaged materials (based on their condition prior to the covered damage and their expected life span), but also of the labor costs associated with the removal of the damaged materials. The trial court certified a class based on McCain's claims, and Baldwin Mutual appealed the certification order. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed the certification order because "the class definition proposed by McCain in her brief submitted after the class-certification hearing was materially different from the class definition offered by McCain in her original complaint." Upon remand, McCain filed a second amended complaint that retained the allegations in her first amended complaint and amended the definition of the proposed class. In response to the amended complaint, Baldwin Mutual moved for motion for a summary judgment, contending that McCain's claims were barred by res judicata based on a final judgment of the trial court in "the Adair litigation," which allegedly involved the same claims and same parties. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in certifying McCain's action for class treatment because the claims of the purported class representative were subject to res judicata. View "Baldwin Mutual Insurance Company v. McCain" on Justia Law

Baldwin Mutual Insurance Company ("Baldwin Mutual") appealed a circuit court’s class certification in a suit filed by Gloria McCain. McCain owned a house insured by Baldwin Mutual. The policy provided that any covered property losses would be settled “at actual cash value at the time of loss but not exceeding the amount necessary to repair or replace the damaged property.” McCain's house was damaged twice, she filed claims and was reimbursed by Baldwin Mutual. In each incident, an independent adjuster examined McCain's damaged property and prepared an estimate. Baldwin Mutual paid McCain's claim in accordance with the estimate prepared by the adjuster. The record contained no allegation or evidence indicating that McCain sought more money from Baldwin Mutual in connection with those claims or that she was unhappy in any way. Nevertheless, McCain’s complaint alleged Baldwin Mutual had wrongfully been reducing the amount paid on claims made on actual-cash-value policies inasmuch as its practice was to deduct some amount for depreciation not only of the damaged materials and the labor costs of initially installing those damaged materials (based on their condition prior to the covered damage and their expected life span), but also of the labor costs associated with the removal of the damaged materials. The trial court certified a class based on McCain's claims, and Baldwin Mutual appealed the certification order. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed the certification order because "the class definition proposed by McCain in her brief submitted after the class-certification hearing was materially different from the class definition offered by McCain in her original complaint." Upon remand, McCain filed a second amended complaint that retained the allegations in her first amended complaint and amended the definition of the proposed class. In response to the amended complaint, Baldwin Mutual moved for motion for a summary judgment, contending that McCain's claims were barred by res judicata based on a final judgment of the trial court in "the Adair litigation," which allegedly involved the same claims and same parties. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in certifying McCain's action for class treatment because the claims of the purported class representative were subject to res judicata. View "Baldwin Mutual Insurance Company v. McCain" on Justia Law