Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries
Altman Contractors, Inc. v. Crum & Forster Specialty Insurance Co.
The Florida Supreme Court answered the Eleventh Circuit's certified question, stating that the notice and repair process set forth in Chapter 558 of the Florida Statutes is a "suit" within the meaning of the CGL policies issued by C&F to ACI. The state court explained that although the chapter 558 process did not constitute a civil proceeding, it was included in the policy's definition of suit as an alternative dispute resolution proceeding to which the insurer's consent was required to invoke the insurer's duty to defend the insured. In light of the state court's answer of the certified question, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for C&F, vacated the final judgment, and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Altman Contractors, Inc. v. Crum & Forster Specialty Insurance Co." on Justia Law
Electric Power Systems International, Inc. v. Zurich American Insurance Co.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Zurich, holding that the district court did not err in concluding that the commercial general liability policy issued by Zurich to EPS did not provide coverage for damage EPS caused to an electrical transformer while working on it. In this case, the "particular part" exclusion applied and there was no coverage for the claimed damage, because the damage to the coil at issue was caused by EPS's incorrect performance of its work in detaching the lead cable from the bushing. View "Electric Power Systems International, Inc. v. Zurich American Insurance Co." on Justia Law
Electric Power Systems International, Inc. v. Zurich American Insurance Co.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Zurich, holding that the district court did not err in concluding that the commercial general liability policy issued by Zurich to EPS did not provide coverage for damage EPS caused to an electrical transformer while working on it. In this case, the "particular part" exclusion applied and there was no coverage for the claimed damage, because the damage to the coil at issue was caused by EPS's incorrect performance of its work in detaching the lead cable from the bushing. View "Electric Power Systems International, Inc. v. Zurich American Insurance Co." on Justia Law
Cox v. Mid-Minnesota Mutual Insurance Co.
A facsimile transmission is not a “delivery” under Minn. R. Civ. P. 3.01(c), which requires that a summons be “delivered” to the sheriff before an action is commenced, because Rule 3.01(c) contemplates personal delivery to the office of the sheriff.In this case, Plaintiff faxed a summons and complaint to the sheriffs in two counties. Deputy sheriffs from both counties personally served Defendants. Defendants moved to dismiss the action, arguing that facsimile transmission did not constitute “delivery” of the summons under Rule 3.01(c). The district court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the sheriffs completed service of process on each of the defendants, thus commencing Plaintiff’s action under Rule 3.01(a). View "Cox v. Mid-Minnesota Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law
Centex Homes v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.
The underlying action was initiated by homeowners from two residential developments in Rocklin against appellants Centex Homes and Centex Real Estate Corporation (Centex) for alleged defects to their homes. Centex and cross-defendant and respondent St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company (St. Paul) have a history of insurance coverage disputes. St. Paul was an insurer for subcontractor Ad Land Venture (Ad Land), and agreed to defend Centex as an additional insured subject to a reservation of rights. Centex filed a cross-complaint against its subcontractors and St. Paul that sought, as the seventh cause of action, a declaration that Centex was entitled to independent counsel under Civil Code section 28601 because St. Paul’s reservation of rights created significant conflicts of interest. Centex appealed after the trial court granted St. Paul’s motion for summary adjudication of Centex’s seventh cause of action. Centex argued any possible or potential conflict was legally sufficient to require St. Paul to provide independent counsel. The Court of Appeal disagreed. Alternatively, Centex contended independent counsel was required because counsel appointed by St. Paul could influence the outcome of the coverage dispute and St. Paul controlled both sides of the litigation. The Court of Appeal concluded that because Centex failed to establish a triable issue of material fact regarding these assertions, the Court affirmed the judgment. View "Centex Homes v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co." on Justia Law
Centex Homes v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.
The underlying action was initiated by homeowners from two residential developments in Rocklin against appellants Centex Homes and Centex Real Estate Corporation (Centex) for alleged defects to their homes. Centex and cross-defendant and respondent St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company (St. Paul) have a history of insurance coverage disputes. St. Paul was an insurer for subcontractor Ad Land Venture (Ad Land), and agreed to defend Centex as an additional insured subject to a reservation of rights. Centex filed a cross-complaint against its subcontractors and St. Paul that sought, as the seventh cause of action, a declaration that Centex was entitled to independent counsel under Civil Code section 28601 because St. Paul’s reservation of rights created significant conflicts of interest. Centex appealed after the trial court granted St. Paul’s motion for summary adjudication of Centex’s seventh cause of action. Centex argued any possible or potential conflict was legally sufficient to require St. Paul to provide independent counsel. The Court of Appeal disagreed. Alternatively, Centex contended independent counsel was required because counsel appointed by St. Paul could influence the outcome of the coverage dispute and St. Paul controlled both sides of the litigation. The Court of Appeal concluded that because Centex failed to establish a triable issue of material fact regarding these assertions, the Court affirmed the judgment. View "Centex Homes v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co." on Justia Law
Citizens Insurance Co. v. Risen Foods, LLC
The Second Circuit reversed the district court's judgment declaring that Citizens was obligated to defend and, if necessary, indemnify Risen Foods under a businessowners policy and an umbrella policy in an underlying suit for damages arising out of a motor vehicle accident. The court held that Risen Foods' vehicle was not covered by either policy. NGM Insurance Co. v. Blakely Pumping, Inc., 593 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2010), was controlling in this case where the operative language of the endorsement in NGM was identical to the operative language in the endorsement added to the Citizens businessowners policy in the pending case. Here, the Risen Foods vehicle was not a "covered auto" under the policies. View "Citizens Insurance Co. v. Risen Foods, LLC" on Justia Law
Citizens Insurance Co. v. Risen Foods, LLC
The Second Circuit reversed the district court's judgment declaring that Citizens was obligated to defend and, if necessary, indemnify Risen Foods under a businessowners policy and an umbrella policy in an underlying suit for damages arising out of a motor vehicle accident. The court held that Risen Foods' vehicle was not covered by either policy. NGM Insurance Co. v. Blakely Pumping, Inc., 593 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2010), was controlling in this case where the operative language of the endorsement in NGM was identical to the operative language in the endorsement added to the Citizens businessowners policy in the pending case. Here, the Risen Foods vehicle was not a "covered auto" under the policies. View "Citizens Insurance Co. v. Risen Foods, LLC" on Justia Law
Bates v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified a certified question of Oregon law to the Oregon Supreme Court. The question related to claims under ORS 124.110 for financial abuse of “vulnerable persons” (here, elderly persons) who purchased long-term care insurance from defendant Bankers Life & Casualty Co. (Bankers) and sought to receive insurance benefits under their policies. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit asked whether a plaintiff states a claim under ORS 124.110(1)(b) for wrongful withholding of money or property where it is alleged that an insurance company has in bad faith delayed the processing of claims and refused to pay benefits owed under an insurance contract. Plaintiffs were elderly Oregonians or their successors who purchased long-term healthcare insurance policies sold by Bankers and its parent company. Plaintiffs alleged Bankers developed onerous procedures to delay and deny insurance claims: failing to answer phone calls, losing documents, denying claims without notifying policyholders, denying claims for reasons that did not comport with Oregon law, and paying policyholders less than what they were owed under their policies. Bankers allegedly collected premium payments and, without good cause, delayed and denied insurance benefits to which Plaintiffs were entitled. The Oregon Supreme Court answered in the negative: allegations that an insurance company, in bad faith, delayed the processing of claims and refused to pay benefits owed to vulnerable persons under an insurance contract do not state a claim under ORS 124.110(1)(b) for wrongful withholding of “money or property.” View "Bates v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co." on Justia Law
Wishnev v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co.
The Ninth Circuit certified the following questions of state law to the California Supreme Court: 1. Are the lenders identified in Article XV of the California Constitution, see Cal. Const. art. XV, 1, as being exempt from the restrictions otherwise imposed by that article, nevertheless subject to the requirement in section 1916-2 of the California Civil Code that a lender may not compound interest "unless an agreement to that effect is clearly expressed in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith"? 2. Does an agreement meet the requirement of section 1916-2 if it is comprised of: (1) an application for insurance signed by the borrower, and (2) a policy of insurance containing an agreement for compound interest that is subsequently attached to the application, thus constituting the entire contract between the parties pursuant to section 10113 of the California Insurance Code? View "Wishnev v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law