Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

The court of appeals did not err in concluding that the denial of Robert Oltmanns’ insurance claim by his insurer, Fire Insurance Exchange, was “fairly debatable,” thus negating Oltmanns’ demand for attorney fees and expenses for a coverage dispute and appeal.When Oltmanns was named as a defendant in a personal injury case he filed a claim with Fire Insurance. Fire Insurance brought a declaratory judgment action to determine whether the claim was covered under Oltmanns’ policy. The court of appeals ruled that the claim was covered. Oltmanns, in turn, filed a counterclaim seeking attorney fees for the declaratory judgment action on the grounds that it was brought in bad faith. The district court granted summary judgment for Fire Insurance, finding that the insurer’s actions were reasonable because the coverage issue was “fairly debatable.” The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the coverage question was, indeed, fairly debatable. View "Fire Insurance Exchange v. Oltmanns" on Justia Law

Fidelity filed suit seeking a declaration that a title insurance policy did not cover mechanics' liens. Captiva filed counterclaims, which sought a declaration that the policy covered the mechanics' liens and which asserted claims against Fidelity for failing to diligently defend and resolve the mechanics' liens claims and for tortiously interfering with Captiva's relationship with the attorneys Fidelity had hired to defend Captiva. The Eighth Circuit held that the district court did not apply the correct legal standard in deciding that Title Insurance Policy Exclusion 3(a) did not apply to the mechanics' liens at issue in this case; Exclusion 3(a) can apply under Missouri law even if the insured did not engage in intentional misconduct or inequitable dealings; Captiva failed to show that the title was unmarketable on or before the effective date of the policy and thus failed to prove its claim that Fidelity breached the policy's unmarketability-of-title provision; and thus the court affirmed the dismissal of the tortious interference claim, vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings, and also vacated the order awarding attorneys' fees and costs. View "Captiva Lake Investments v. Fidelity National Title Insurance" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the confirmation of an appraisal award under homeowners insurance policies issued by Liberty Mutual. Plaintiffs claimed that the appraisers exceeded their authority regarding the award and that it was the product of fraud. In the published portion of this opinion, the court held that the trial court erred under Evidence Code section 703.5 in admitting part of an appraiser's declaration that plaintiffs offered in opposing confirmation of the award. View "Khorsand v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Victaulic, a manufacturer, sued its insurers in connection with product liability claims that resulted in litigation. Following summary adjudication for Victaulic (duty to defend) and a declaratory ruling (duty to indemnify), the case proceeded to a jury trial on Victaulic’s bad faith claim. Numerous witnesses testified and over 100 exhibits were introduced. Reversing an in limine ruling, the court allowed Victaulic to interrogate Finberg, the examiner on most of the claims, who had verified the insurers’ responses to Victaulic’s requests for admissions (RFAs). The court concluded Finberg “made an admission that she perjured herself” and stopped Finberg’s testimony. When she resumed the stand the next day, represented by personal counsel, the court ruled that she could, on a blanket basis, claim the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination— in front of jury. Victaulic’s closing arguments focused on “Finberg,” “RFAs,” “lies,” and “penalty of perjury.” The jury awarded damages for breach of contract totaling $1,073,868.80, with attorney fee damages for bad faith of $8,259,712.31. The punitive damages trial resulted in an award of $46 million. The court of appeal reversed, finding prejudicial errors, beginning with the court’s allowance of the use of the RFA responses, compounded by the court’s intensive questioning of Finberg, and by several errors in handling Finberg’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment. View "Victaulic Co. v. American Home Assurance Co." on Justia Law

The plain language of Neb. Rev. Stat. 44-513 does not require insurance policies to charge identical copayments for a covered service regardless of the type of provider.Health insurance policyholders brought this declaratory judgment action to determine whether section 44-513 allows insurance policies to impose higher copayments on policyholders when they obtain a covered service from a chiropractor rather than from a medical doctor. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the statute did not require insurers to pay the same dollar amount to all providers or to set equal copayments for policyholders. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the plain language of the statute does not prohibit an insurer from requiring different copayments for different types of providers. View "Cookson v. Ramge" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was whether the district court correctly held that ACE American Insurance Company (ACE) had no duty to defend and indemnify DISH Network (DISH) in a lawsuit alleging that DISH’s use of telemarketing phone calls violated various federal and state laws. The primary question centered on whether statutory damages and injunctive relief under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act were “damages” under the insurance policies at issue and insurable under Colorado law, or were uninsurable “penalties.” The Court concluded they were penalties under controlling Colorado law, and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of ACE. View "ACE American Insurance Company v. Dish Network" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was whether the district court correctly held that ACE American Insurance Company (ACE) had no duty to defend and indemnify DISH Network (DISH) in a lawsuit alleging that DISH’s use of telemarketing phone calls violated various federal and state laws. The primary question centered on whether statutory damages and injunctive relief under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act were “damages” under the insurance policies at issue and insurable under Colorado law, or were uninsurable “penalties.” The Court concluded they were penalties under controlling Colorado law, and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of ACE. View "ACE American Insurance Company v. Dish Network" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against ASIC, alleging that its conduct in handling her insurance claim constituted an unfair claims settlement practice in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. 58-63-15(11), and, as a matter of law, an unfair and deceptive trade practice in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. 75-1.1. The Fourth Circuit held that because North Carolina law required ASIC to appoint and authorize the Commissioner as its agent for service of process as a condition of writing insurance in the state, and because this was the only authority ASIC provided the Commissioner, the Commissioner was merely ASIC's statutory agent for service of process; service on a statutory agent was not service on the defendant within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 1446(b); the district court did not err in determining that ASIC timely filed notice of removal and in denying plaintiff's motion for remand based on her allegations of untimely filing; diversity jurisdiction existed and the district court did not err in denying plaintiff's motion for remand based on an alleged lack of subject matter jurisdiction; and the district court did not err in granting ASIC's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. View "Elliott v. American States Insurance Co." on Justia Law

After transporters damaged cargo, Lloyds filed suit seeking to recover from the transporters the damages that Lloyds paid to its insured. The Eleventh Circuit explained that, because the transporters damaged one part of a machine that could not operate without the damaged part, the extent of the transporters' liability depended on whether the Montreal Convention or the waybill controlled. The court held that the district court erred in ruling that the Montreal Convention governed the transporters' liability, but rather, the waybill governed the transporters' liability. Because the waybill was ambiguous about the weight that should be used to calculate liability, the court remanded the case for the district court to address the issue in the first instance. View "Underwriters at Lloyds Subscribing to Cover Note B0753PC1308275000 v. Expeditors Korea Ltd." on Justia Law

Antonicelli, was a passenger in a vehicle traveling on I-88. Three lanes were closed for construction. Browder was operating a semi-tractor and trailer, traveling behind Antonicelli’s vehicle. Rodriguez, under the influence of cocaine, made an improper U-turn through the median and collided with Antonicelli’s vehicle, causing it to rotate. Browder was unable to stop his semi and slammed into Antonicelli’s vehicle. Antonicelli suffered severe permanent injuries. Rodriguez pled guilty to aggravated driving under the influence of drugs and acknowledged fault. Antonicelli sued and entered ­ into a settlement with Rodriguez for $20,000, the limit of his insurance coverage. Rodriguez sought a finding of a good-faith settlement, informing the court that the insurance policy was his only material asset. The nonsettling Browder defendants counterclaimed for contribution against Rodriguez, alleging that Rodriguez’s conduct was intentional rather than negligent under the Contribution Act (740 ILCS 100/2). The court granted Rodriguez a finding of good faith and dismissal, allowing the Browder defendants to credit $20,000 against any future judgment. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, finding no basis for the allegation of intentional conduct. The Browder counterclaims alleging intentional conduct are separate and independent causes of action that do not change the nature of Antonicelli’s complaint, which alleged only negligent conduct. Requiring a court to make a determination as to each defendant’s fault before finding that a settlement agreement was in good faith would be impracticable and would defeat the Act's purpose of encouraging settlement in the absence of bad faith, fraud, or collusion. View "Antonicelli v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law