Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a gas station owner, filed suit demanding that its insurer pay for damages when the fiberglass sheath of one of its underground gasoline storage tanks split after resting on a rock for 16 years. The Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment to the insurer, holding that a substantial impairment of the tank's structural integrity did not constitute a "collapse" as a matter of law. View "Tustin Field Gas & Food v. Mid-Century Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Ashley Palmer (Palmer) and Stephen Palmer appealed a district court’s order granting Lisa Ellefson’s motion for a new trial under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6). Ellefson was involved in an automobile accident caused by Palmer. A jury found that Ellefson was not injured in the accident. However, the district court determined that the jury verdict of “no injury” was against the clear weight of evidence and granted a new trial subject to an additur in the amount of $50,000. On appeal, Palmer argued that the district court abused its discretion in granting the new trial and in setting additur at $50,000. Finding no such error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ellefson v. Palmer" on Justia Law

Answering certified questions from the Eleventh Circuit, the Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that, while O.C.G.A. 9-11-67.1 sets forth certain terms and conditions that must be included in every written offer of settlement, nothing in Georgia law or the statute precludes parties from requiring "some additional act to effectuate acceptance;" O.C.G.A. 9-11-67.1 permits unilateral contracts whereby Pre-Suit Offers may demand acceptance in the form of performance before there was a binding enforceable settlement contract; and O.C.G.A. 9-11-67.1 does not preclude a Pre-Suit Offer from demanding timely payment as a condition of acceptance. In light of these answers, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court correctly determined that O.C.G.A. 9-11-67.1 does not prohibit a party from requiring timely payment as a condition of acceptance of a settlement offer; the offer letter in this case unambiguously conditioned acceptance on timely payment; the insurers' issuance of two $50,000 checks with incomplete addresses, which never reached defendants or their attorney, did not satisfy this timely-payment condition; and the insurer failed to accept defendants' settlement offer, thus preventing the formation of a binding settlement agreement. Accordingly, the court affirmed summary judgment for defendants. View "Grange Mutual Casualty Co. v. Woodard" on Justia Law

Duarte's Oakland property was occupied by Bowers. Bowers’s daughter, Pleasants, moved into the property and remained after Bowers died. In February 2012, Duarte gave Pleasants a 45-day notice to quit, but she did not leave. On April 19, Duarte obtained landlord-tenant insurance coverage for the property with Pacific, including “Owners, Landlords & Tenants Liability Coverage,” effective April 19, 2012. In June 2012, Pleasants sued Duarte, alleging that habitability defects had allegedly existed throughout the tenancy. Duarte tendered defense of the suit to Pacific, which denied coverage. Duarte sought a declaration that the policy required Pacific to defend the tenant suit and sought damages for breach of contract. Pacific alleged material misrepresentations by Duarte on the application; he represented that there were no disputes concerning the property although he knew that the tenant had complained to the city and that there was no business conducted on the property although he knew the tenant was running a business. The court of appeal ruled in favor of Duarte. Pacific’s question about the existence of pending claims, property disputes, or lawsuits concerning the property was “utterly ambiguous.” Pacific did not show that Duarte knew a “business” was conducted on the property at the time he submitted his application. View "Duarte v. Pacific Specialty Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Drake was involved in a car accident with Burley, who offered to settle the matter with Drake’s automobile insurer, Horace Mann Insurance. The offer expired before Horace Mann accepted it, however, and Burley sued Drake and sent a letter to Drake’s lawyer suggesting that Horace Mann had handled the matter in bad faith. Believing that this letter constituted a “claim” against Horace Mann for extra-contractual damages that had accrued before the start date of Horace Mann’s own insurance policy with Lexington Insurance, Lexington sought a judicial declaration that it had no duty to indemnify Horace Mann under that policy. Horace Mann counterclaimed for breach of contract and requested (pursuant to an Illinois statute) additional damages for “vexatious and unreasonable” claims-handling. Horace Mann also filed a third-party complaint against its insurance broker, Aon, for negligence in reporting the extra-contractual “claim” to Lexington. The district court rejected Lexington’s suit on summary judgment and awarded judgment as a matter of law to Lexington and Aon on Horace Mann’s claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Lexington Insurance Co. v. Horace Mann Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Laser Line Construction Company, LLC,(“Laser Line”) purchased statutory workers’ compensation insurance coverage from the Builders and Contractors Association of Mississippi (“BCAM”) Self Insurers’ Fund. Because Laser Line was a general contractor, BCAM sought premium payments for all employees of Laser Line’s subcontractors who did not independently secure workers’ compensation coverage. Laser Line refused to pay premiums for employees of subcontractors who had fewer than five employees and claimed they were thus exempt from the coverage requirement. BCAM canceled Laser Line’s coverage for nonpayment. Laser Line filed suit for damages and a declaratory judgment. The defendants answered, and BCAM separately filed a counterclaim. The parties filed competing summary judgment motions. The trial court granted Laser Line a partial summary judgment on the statutory interpretation issue. BCAM sought and was granted permission to file an interlocutory appeal. Mississippi Code Section 71-3-7 required general contractors secure workers’ compensation coverage for the employees of its uninsured subcontractors; the Mississippi Supreme Court found consistent with the unambiguous language of the statute and its own prior opinions, the number of employees of the subcontractor was not a factor in determining general-contractor liability under the Act. Thus, the trial judge’s contrary ruling was in error. View "Builders & Contractors Association of Mississippi, v. Laser Line Construction Company, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court finding that the tortfeasor who injured Appellants in a motor vehicle accident was not an underinsured driver pursuant to Maine’s underinsured motorist (UM) statute, and therefore, there was no gap in coverage requiring State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company to pay UM benefits under two policies issued to Appellants. The court held that because Appellants recovered far more from the tortfeasor’s insurers than the maximum amount of UM coverage provided by the State Farm policies, they surpassed the same recovery that would have been available had the tortfeasor been insured to the same extent. Therefore, there was no UM gap that State Farm was responsible to cover. View "Wallace v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s dismissal of Standard Fire Insurance Co.’s case against Continental Resources Inc. pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws 15-6-12(b)(5). Standard Fire brought suit seeking statutory reimbursement or, in the alternative, equitable subrogation of workers’ compensation benefits paid to an employee. The circuit court found that the terms of a settlement agreement barred further litigation and that res judicata applied. The Supreme Court disagreed and remanded the matter for further proceedings, holding that the circuit court erred when it determined that the plain language of the settlement agreement barred Standard Fire’s claim. View "Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Continental Resources, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2007, undercover producers from NBC Universal, Inc., attended and surreptitiously recorded a seminar presented by plaintiff-appellant Brokers’ Choice of America, Inc. to teach insurance agents how to sell annuities to seniors. NBC used excerpts and information from the seminar in a “Dateline NBC” episode. Brokers’ Choice and its founder Tyrone Clark (collectively, “BCA”) sued for defamation. This appeal concerned the district court’s dismissal of the amended complaint after it compared the seminar recording with the episode and concluded the Dateline program was substantially true. After review, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed because the Dateline episode was not materially false. View "Brokers' Choice of America v. NBC Universal" on Justia Law

Lexington Insurance denied a claim by its insured, Double D Warehouse, for coverage of Double D’s liability to customers for contamination of warehoused products. One basis for denial was that Double D failed to document its warehousing transactions with warehouse receipts, storage agreements, or rate quotations, as required by the policies. PQ was a customer of Double D whose products were damaged while warehoused there. PQ settled its case against Double D by stepping into Double D’s shoes to try to collect on the policies. PQ argued that there were pragmatic reasons to excuse strict compliance with the policy’s terms. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Lexington. PQ accurately claimed that the documentation Double D actually had (bills of lading and an online tracking system) should serve much the same purpose as the documentation required by the policies (especially warehouse receipts), but commercially sophisticated parties agreed to unambiguous terms and conditions of insurance. Courts hold them to those terms. To do otherwise would disrupt the risk allocations that are part and parcel of any contract, but particularly a commercial liability insurance contract. PQ offered no persuasive reason to depart from the plain language of the policies. View "PQ Corp. v. Lexington Insurance Co." on Justia Law