Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners, United Insurance Company of America and the Reliable Life Insurance Company, filed a declaratory action against Respondents, the Maryland Insurance Administration, et al., (“MIA”) challenging the retroactive enforcement of Md. Code (2011 Repl. Vol., 2015 Supp.) sections 16-118 of the Insurance Article (“Ins.”). Section 16-118 imposed a duty on an insurer who “issues, delivers, or renews a policy of life insurance or an annuity contract . . .” in the State to “perform a comparison of [their] in-force life insurance policies, annuity contracts, and retained assets accounts against the latest version of a death master file to identify any death benefit payments that may be due. . . .” on a regular or semi-annual basis. Prior to this legislation, insurers were under no obligation to research whether a policyholder had died, and the statute did not indicate whether its provisions applied retroactively to existing insurance policies. The circuit court dismissed Petitioners’ action based on the failure to exhaust administrative remedies afforded by the Insurance Article. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Special Appeals agreed, and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. After its review, the Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court and affirmed. View "United Insurance v. MD Insurance Admin." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the apportionment of damages between two insurance companies who provided underinsured motorist (UM) coverave to a passenger injured in an automobile accident in Bowling Green. The Circuit Court ordered the companies to share the damages pro rata in proportion to their respective policy limits. Countryway Insurance appealed that decision to the Court of Appeals, contending that the damages should not have been divided at all, but should have been apportioned entirely to United Financial, the insurer of the accident vehicle. To Countryway's dismay, the Court of Appeals panel decided that that argument was "half right:" the Court agreed that the damages should not have been divided, but in its view Countryway, the insurer of the injured passenger, bore full responsibility for the passenger's UM claim. The Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals erred in its analysis of the controlling case-law applicable to this matter, reversed and remanded to the Circuit Court for entry of an appropriate order in favor of Countryway. View "Countryway Ins. Co. v. United Financial Casualty Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In Tidyman’s I, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s finding that National Union Fire Insurance breached its duty to defend its insured, David and Maxwell. The Court, however, reversed the district court’s entry of summary judgment to the extent it approved a stipulated judgment of $29 million. The Court remanded for the district court to hold a hearing to assess the reasonableness of the settlement amount. On remand, after a reasonableness hearing, the district court again approved the stipulated settlement. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court for a second reasonableness hearing, holding (1) the district court erred in using a “reliable evidence” test to assess the reasonableness of the stipulated judgment; and (2) the district court erred in holding that Plaintiffs were entitled to prejudgment interest. View "Tidyman’s Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Zachery Edens was killed in when an oncoming car turned in front of his motorcycle. David Edens, Zachery's father and the Chief Executive Officer of Edens Structural Solutions LLC (Edens LLC), and Rhonda Edens, Zachery's mother, sent a demand letter to The Netherlands Insurance Company, claiming that Zachery was an insured under Edens LLC’s Netherlands insurance policy and demanding $1,000,000 in underinsured motorist benefits. After Netherlands denied coverage, David, Rhonda, and Edens LLC sued Netherlands. On summary judgment, the district court concluded that David was an insured under the policy because he was an executive officer of Edens LLC, and that Zachery was an insured as David's family member. Despite this, because David and Rhonda Edens owned Zachery's motorcycle, the district court concluded that the Netherlands policy didn’t cover his accident. David, Rhonda and Edens LLC appealed, arguing, among other things, that the policy’s coverage terms were ambiguous and should be construed in their favor. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Edens v. Netherlands Insurance" on Justia Law

After he was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis, plaintiff applied for long term disability benefits under his Sun Life policy. The policy required plaintiff to provide written notice of his claim within 30 days of the end of a set period of time (referred to as the elimination period), and to provide proof of his claim no later than 90 days after the end of the elimination period. The policy also included a limitations period requiring any lawsuit regarding benefits to be brought within 3 years of the date that proof of claim was required. In this case, plaintiff did not file his lawsuit until March 2013, well after the contractual limitations period had expired. Therefore, the court concluded that plaintiff's suit is untimely and affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Sun Life. View "Schmitz v. Sun Life Assurance Co." on Justia Law

A1's, packages and sells landscaping materials, filed suit against Decker to recover losses after Decker sold defective plastic bags to A1's. Because Decker failed to manufacture the bags with an ultraviolet inhibitor (UVI), the bags deteriorated in the sunlight, causing small shreds of plastic to commingle with A1’s landscaping materials, sometimes while still in A1’s inventory and sometimes after delivery to its customers. Decker filed a claim with its comprehensive general liability (CGL) insurer, West Bend. After West Bend denied coverage, Decker filed suit and West Bend removed to federal court. The district court granted summary judgment to West Bend. Determining that Iowa law governs the court's interpretation of the West Bend policy, the court concluded that there was an "occurrence" triggering coverage under the terms of West Bend's policy. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Decker Plastics Inc. v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Kurtrina Smith and Rickey Levins separately initiated actions against defendants the African Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc. ("the AME Church"); James L. Davis, bishop and presiding officer of the AME Church's Ninth Episcopal District (collectively, "the Ninth District"); and Lincoln National Life Insurance Company ("Lincoln National") after Lincoln National denied their respective claims for benefits filed pursuant to a group life-insurance policy Davis had purchased from Lincoln National on behalf of the Ninth District. Smith and Levins alleged the group policy provided coverage for Smith's mother and Levins's father. The defendants moved the trial court hearing each action to compel arbitration pursuant to arbitration provisions that were allegedly part of the group policy and certificates. The trial court denied those motions, and defendants appealed. Finding that the trial court erred in denying the motion, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for arbitration proceedings. View "African Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc. v. Levins" on Justia Law

Jim Hipner, LLC (Hipner), a trucking company, obtained an umbrella policy from Century Surety Company (Century) that contained a notice provision stating that the insured will notify Century “as soon as practicable” of an occurrence, offense, or injury. When one of Hipner’s drivers produced a multi-vehicle collision (the accident) that resulted in a serious injury, Century filed suit in federal court seeking a declaratory judgment that it did not have an obligation to defend or indemnify Hipner in connection with any claims relating to the accident because Hipner failed to provide written notice “as soon as practicable.” The district court concluded that Century received timely notice under the policy as a matter of Wyoming law. Century appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit certified a question to the Wyoming Supreme Court regarding the enforceability of the insurance policy notice provision. The Supreme Court answered that, under Wyoming law and regardless of the express language of the insurance policy, an insurer must be prejudiced before being entitled to deny coverage when the insured has failed to give notice “as soon as practicable.” View "Century Surety Co. v. Jim Hipner, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2011, Linda Phillips, an employee of Hoker Trucking, driving a semi‐truck in Indiana, struck a vehicle driven by Robbins, who died as a result of the injuries he sustained in the accident. The truck driven by Phillips was pulling a trailer Hoker borrowed from Lakeville. Lakeville had a Great West Casualty insurance policy covering the trailer. There was a separate suit concerning the liability of Phillips and Hoker. To preempt a possible claim against Lakeville’s policy, Great West sought a declaratory judgment against Hoker, Phillips, and Robbins’s estate, that it did not have to indemnify Hoker and Phillips for any liability in connection with the accident. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Great West. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that Great West’s policy was ambiguous as to whether Hoker and Phillips were excluded from coverage and should be construed against Great West; that even if the exclusions are not ambiguous, they do not exclude Hoker and Phillips from coverage; and regardless of whether the exclusions apply to Hoker and Phillips or not, such exclusions are invalid under Wisconsin law, the state where the trailer is registered. The court found the policy unambiguous. View "Great West Cas. Co. v. Robbins" on Justia Law

Westchester was a commercial umbrella insurer for EMJ, a general contractor building a J.C. Penney store. During that project, EMJ subcontracted with Contract Steel for steel erection services. Contract Steel purchased a commercial umbrella policy from Hudson Insurance. After a building inspector examining Contract Steel's work fell off a ladder and suffered severe spinal injury, the inspector filed suit against a group of defendants, including EMJ. EMJ settled for five million dollars and EMJ’s primary liability insurer covered one million dollars. Westchester covered the remaining four million dollars. EMJ and Westchester filed suit against Hudson in the federal district court seeking reimbursement for the four million dollar settlement. The district court ultimately determined that the four million dollars should be apportioned between Hudson and Westchester based on their policy limits. This led the district court to determine that Hudson was responsible for paying Westchester only $667,000 in damages. The district court denied Westchester’s motion to reconsider. Both parties appealed. The court rejected Hudson's four arguments challenging coverage by its policy and concluded that Hudson was required to indemnify EMJ, at least in part, for the legal settlement from the inspector’s fall; the court rejected Hudson's two evidentiary challenges; and the district court correctly followed Mississippi law and ordered Hudson to pay Westchester 1/6th of the cost of the legal settlement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "EMJ Corp. v. Hudson Specialty Ins." on Justia Law