Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

In 2011, Linda Phillips, an employee of Hoker Trucking, driving a semi‐truck in Indiana, struck a vehicle driven by Robbins, who died as a result of the injuries he sustained in the accident. The truck driven by Phillips was pulling a trailer Hoker borrowed from Lakeville. Lakeville had a Great West Casualty insurance policy covering the trailer. There was a separate suit concerning the liability of Phillips and Hoker. To preempt a possible claim against Lakeville’s policy, Great West sought a declaratory judgment against Hoker, Phillips, and Robbins’s estate, that it did not have to indemnify Hoker and Phillips for any liability in connection with the accident. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Great West. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that Great West’s policy was ambiguous as to whether Hoker and Phillips were excluded from coverage and should be construed against Great West; that even if the exclusions are not ambiguous, they do not exclude Hoker and Phillips from coverage; and regardless of whether the exclusions apply to Hoker and Phillips or not, such exclusions are invalid under Wisconsin law, the state where the trailer is registered. The court found the policy unambiguous. View "Great West Cas. Co. v. Robbins" on Justia Law

Westchester was a commercial umbrella insurer for EMJ, a general contractor building a J.C. Penney store. During that project, EMJ subcontracted with Contract Steel for steel erection services. Contract Steel purchased a commercial umbrella policy from Hudson Insurance. After a building inspector examining Contract Steel's work fell off a ladder and suffered severe spinal injury, the inspector filed suit against a group of defendants, including EMJ. EMJ settled for five million dollars and EMJ’s primary liability insurer covered one million dollars. Westchester covered the remaining four million dollars. EMJ and Westchester filed suit against Hudson in the federal district court seeking reimbursement for the four million dollar settlement. The district court ultimately determined that the four million dollars should be apportioned between Hudson and Westchester based on their policy limits. This led the district court to determine that Hudson was responsible for paying Westchester only $667,000 in damages. The district court denied Westchester’s motion to reconsider. Both parties appealed. The court rejected Hudson's four arguments challenging coverage by its policy and concluded that Hudson was required to indemnify EMJ, at least in part, for the legal settlement from the inspector’s fall; the court rejected Hudson's two evidentiary challenges; and the district court correctly followed Mississippi law and ordered Hudson to pay Westchester 1/6th of the cost of the legal settlement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "EMJ Corp. v. Hudson Specialty Ins." on Justia Law

Child Doe brought a civil action against Mark Tully, alleging that Tully negligently sexually assaulted Doe while he was intoxicated. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company previously issued a homeowners insurance policy to Tully providing that State Farm would defend Tully from claims resulting from an “occurrence” but not from claims resulting from Tully’s intentional actions. State Farm brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment that it owed no duty to defend Tully under the policy. The trial court granted summary judgment for State Farm, concluding that Tully’s actions fell outside the scope of the policy and, therefore, State Farm had no duty to defend him under the presumption of intent established in United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Marburg. Tully and Doe appealed, arguing that the evidence that Tully was intoxicated at the time of the incident created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his actions were intentional. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that evidence of voluntary intoxication may not negate intent in duty to defend cases such as the case here. View "State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tully" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Mercury for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Judgment was entered in favor of plaintiffs for $3 million plus interest from the date of judgment in the underlying personal injury action. The court concluded that substantial evidence supports the finding that Mercury unreasonably refused to accept the modified release where the offering of the policy limits was not sufficient in and of itself to defeat a bad faith claim as a matter of law, and substantial evidence supports the referee’s finding that Mercury unreasonably rejected the policy limits settlement proposed by counsel for plaintiffs. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Barickman v. Mercury Cas. Co." on Justia Law

Floyd Cornelison injured his back at work in 1996 while shoveling dirt. He had back surgery later that year, but it did little to improve his condition. The Board found he was permanently and totally disabled (PTD) in 2001 under the "odd-lot doctrine." TIG Insurance, the workers’ compensation insurer for Floyd’s employer, did not contest that he was PTD; it reclassified his workers’ compensation benefits as PTD in 2000. Floyd also received Social Security disability payments, and the employer received an offset for those payments. The employer and TIG challenged Cornelison's continuing eligibility for workers’ compensation, relying on surreptitious video surveillance and a doctor’s report issued after the doctor viewed an edited surveillance video. Cornelison and his wife sued TIG and a number of others involved in the attempt to terminate benefits; they alleged several causes of action, contending that the video had been purposely edited to provide a false picture of the employee’s physical abilities and that the defendants had participated to varying degrees in a scheme to defraud the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board. The trial court granted summary judgment or dismissal as to all of the defendants on all counts. After review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The Court concluded the Cornelisons provided enough evidence to show that a material factual dispute existed about the accuracy of the edited videos and the manner in which the videos were created. They also presented more than generalized claims of emotional distress. Because the superior court failed to address the issues in dispute in the IIED claim against certain persons involved with the making of the videos, we reverse the grant of summary judgment on this claim and remand to the superior court. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Cornelison v. TIG Insurance" on Justia Law

Rizvi and his company, Prime Builders, performed repair work for Alikhan, whose house was damaged in a fire. When the work was completed in 2009, Alikhan paid Rizvi only part of what he owed. Rizvi sued for breach of contract in federal court, invoking diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332. (Rizvi and Prime are Illinois citizens. Alikhan is a citizen of Texas.) When Alikhan failed to appear, plaintiffs obtained a default judgment, then served a citation to discover assets on Allstate under an Illinois statute that governs supplementary proceedings to assist in collecting on a judgment. Allstate responded that Alikhan had no accounts of any sort with Allstate, had no claims pending with Allstate, and was not owed any insurance payments by Allstate. Plaintiffs then asked the court to order Allstate to remit “outstanding insurance proceeds of $110,926.58” and to impose sanctions, arguing that Allstate had participated in negotiating the repair contract and had made a partial payment to Alikhan in 2008. The court ultimately dismissed the supplemental action. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Allstate is a citizen of Illinois, the supplemental proceeding against Allstate was sufficiently independent of the underlying case as to require its own basis for subject matter jurisdiction. View "Rizvi v. Allstate Corp." on Justia Law

An employee of NTC Transportation, Inc. (“NTC”) filed petitions with the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission (“the Commission”), claiming he had suffered compensable work-related injuries on two occasions. AmFed National Insurance Co. (“Amfed”), believing NTC’s workers’ compensation coverage to have lapsed due to NTC’s failure to timely pay the premium, responded and denied both liability and coverage as to the latter injury. AmFed’s denial of coverage was litigated and culminated in a judgment rendered in NTC’s favor. Based on the applicable law and particular facts of this case, the Supreme Court found that NTC had no insurance coverage with AmFed in effect at the time of the relevant injury. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded. View "Amfed National Insurance Co. v. NTC Transportation, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2012, Williams visited the Van de Venters in Monroe County, Indiana. They told Williams that their labrador retriever, Emma, would ring a bell by the door if she needed to go out and he should let her out. Williams chose to walk Emma on a leash. When a neighborhood dog barked, Emma lurched toward the sound, pulling Williams to the ground and seriously injuring his shoulder. Williams sued the Van de Venters. Their AmFam home-insurance policy included personal liability coverage indemnifying them for damages for bodily injury and guaranteeing a defense against such suits. The policy contained a provision stating: “Intra-Insured Suits. We will not cover bodily injury to any ‘insured’,” defined as “any person ... legally responsible for a[n] ... animal owned by [a named insured or resident relative of a named insured] to which [the policy’s personal-liability coverages] apply.” The district court rejected AmFam’s position that these provisions relieved it of the duty to defend or indemnify. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It would make no sense to treat Williams as if he were “legally responsible” for his own injuries resulting from the dog’s actions; he was not an insured for purposes of this incident. View "Am. Family Mut. Ins. v. Williams" on Justia Law

In 2006, plaintiffs procured a mortgage from Regions to purchase a home near the Cumberland River. The National Flood Insurance Act (NFIA) requires mortgagors to obtain flood insurance for properties in flood zones, 42 U.S.C. 4012a(b)(1). CoreLogic provided Regions with flood-zone certification. The National Flood Insurance Program Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM) showed that the property was in a Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHA), but CoreLogic informed plaintiffs that their property was in a non-SFHA zone. FEMA issued a revised FIRM for the area months later. Regions informed plaintiffs that their home was in a flood zone and that they must procure flood insurance within 45 days. Plaintiffs hired Vandenbergh, who procured for them a Nationwide Standard Flood Insurance Policy for a home constructed before the effective FIRM. Plaintiffs’ home, built in 1984, after the 1981 FIRM, required a post-FIRM policy, under which they could receive full coverage only after obtaining an elevation certificate showing sufficient elevation above the base flood zone. A 2010 flood submerged plaintiffs’ home in 16” of water. Nationwide informed plaintiffs of pre-/post-FIRM discrepancy and required an elevation certificate, which showed that the home’s lower level was below the base flood-zone elevation. Because plaintiffs’ home was post-FIRM and situated below the base flood-zone elevation, their SFIP did not cover all losses “below the lowest elevated floor.” FEMA upheld Nationwide’s coverage determination. The Sixth Circuit affirmed partial summary judgment for Vandenbergh, but vacated dismissal of claims against Regions, CoreLogic, and Nationwide. The NFIA did not preempt state-law claims arising from procurement of the SFIP: that plaintiffs would not have purchased their home absent defendants’ negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. View "Harris v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins." on Justia Law

This dispute arose from the construction of Cypress Point, a luxury condominium complex in Hoboken. Co-defendants Adria Towers, LLC, Metro Homes, LLC, and Commerce Construction Management, LLC (collectively, the developer) served as the project's developer and general contractor, and subcontractors carried out most of the work. During construction, the developer obtained four CGL policies from Evanston Insurance Company, covering a four-year period, and three from Crum & Forster Specialty Insurance Company, covering a subsequent three-year period (collectively, the policies). In this appeal, issue before the Supreme Court was whether rain water damage caused by a subcontractor's faulty workmanship constituted property damage and an occurrence under the developer's commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policy. In a published decision, the Appellate Division reversed, holding that, under the plain language of the CGL policies, the unintended and unexpected consequential damages caused by the subcontractors faulty workmanship constituted property damage and an occurrence. The Supreme Court agreed and affirmed, finding that the consequential damages caused by the subcontractors faulty workmanship constituted property damage, and the event resulting in that damage water from rain flowing into the interior of the property due to the subcontractors faulty workmanship was an occurrence under the plain language of the CGL policies at issue here. View "CypressPoint Condominium Association, Inc. v. Adria Towers, L.L.C., et al." on Justia Law