Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

Bellingham filed a beach of contract claim against BancInsure after BancInsure denied coverage for loss that BancInsure claimed was not caused by employee-caused loss exclusions, exclusions for theft of confidential information,nor exclusions for mechanical breakdown or deterioration of a computer system. The district court granted summary judgment to Bellingham. The court concluded that no Minnesota case precludes application of the concurrent-causation doctrine to financial institution bonds. The court found that Minnesota courts would adhere to the general rule of treating financial institution bonds as insurance polices and interpreting those bonds in accordance with the principles of insurance law. Furthermore, the court rejected BancInsure’s argument that the Bond imposes a higher standard-of-proof than the concurrent-causation doctrine. Bellingham still had to show that its loss was directly caused by the fraudulent transfer, and the application of the concurrent-causation doctrine did not interfere with that requirement. The court also rejected BancInsure’s argument that the parties successfully drafted around the concurrent-causation doctrine in the Bond. As a matter of law, the Bond’s reference to “indirectly” is not a sufficient invocation of the “anti-concurrent causation” provision, and thus the Bond at issue in this matter does not contain such a provision. Finally, the court agreed with the district court's conclusion that the efficient and proximate cause of the loss was the illegal transfer of the money and not the employees' violations of policies and procedures. In this case, the overriding cause of the loss Bellingham suffered remains the criminal activity of a third party. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "State Bank of Bellingham v. BancInsure, Inc." on Justia Law

Stampley, an independent truck driver, sued Altom Transport, alleging that Altom had failed to pay him enough for driving his truck for it. Altom turned to its insurer, Westchester, for coverage in the suit. Westchester denied coverage; Altom handled its own defense; and the parties tried to settle. At that point, counsel for both Stampley and Altom tried to pull Westchester into the case, by making settlement offers within the limits of the Westchester policy and seeking Westchester’s approval. Westchester did not participate. Altom sought a declaratory judgment establishing that Westchester had a duty to defend, that it wrongfully had failed to do so, and that its handling of the matter had been unreasonable and vexatious. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the suit, finding that all of the claims in the underlying suit arise directly from Stampley’s lease agreement with Altom and fell within the policy’s contract claim exception. View "Stampley v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In appeal no. 1140870, Southern Cleaning Service, Inc. ("SCSI"), appealed the grant of summary judgment entered favor of Essex Insurance Company and Genesee General Agency, Inc. (collectively, "the insurance defendants"), on SCSI's claims stemming from Essex's refusal to provide SCSI coverage under a commercial general-liability policy based on an alleged failure to timely notify Essex of the facts leading to the claim for coverage. In appeal no. 1140918, the insurance defendants cross-appealed the trial court's denial of their requests for costs. Winn-Dixie Montgomery, LLC entered into a contract with SCSI for provide floor-care and general janitorial services to multiple grocery stores in central Alabama. SCSI entered into a subcontract with Phase II Maintenance Systems, LLC, whereby Phase II became responsible for providing those services. That subcontract required Phase II to carry a minimum level of liability insurance and to list both SCSI and Winn-Dixie as "additional insureds" on such policies. Phase II contacted Alabama Auto Insurance Center ("Alabama Auto") for a policy; Alabama Auto in turn contacted Genesee, a managing general agency located in Georgia that connected independent agents like Alabama Auto with different insurance companies that provided the type of coverage being sought by the independent agent's customer. Ultimately, Genesee sent Alabama Auto a quote for a commercial general-liability policy issued by Essex that would meet Phase II's needs, and Alabama Auto presented that quote to Phase II. Phase II accepted the quote; Alabama Auto transmitted notice of that acceptance to Genesee; and Genesee, which held issuing authority for Essex, then issued Phase II the desired policy on behalf of Essex. In 2011, Beverly Paige was shopping at a Phase II-serviced Winn-Dixie in Montgomery when she allegedly slipped on a wet floor, fell, and was injured. A Phase II employee on duty at the store at the time of the fall reported the incident to Phase II's owner and president, William Wedgeworth, that same day, and Wedgeworth has given sworn testimony indicating that he separately notified both SCSI and Alabama Auto of the incident on the next available business day,and further specifically asked Alabama Auto to notify Genesee of the incident. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in granting summary judgment, citing several disputes of material fact that should have precluded the court's ultimate decision. As such, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the outcome for further proceedings. The cross appeal was rendered moot. View "Essex Insurance Company and Genesee General Agency, Inc. v. Southern Cleaning Service, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Stephanie Buckley sought PIP benefits following an accident involving a school bus. Defendant State Farm insured the school bus that Buckley intended to take to school on March 27, 2012. Buckley was hit by another vehicle when, after receiving the signal from the bus driver, she crossed the street to board the bus. In a detailed opinion, the Superior Court explained why Buckley was entitled to PIP coverage from State Farm. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the Superior Court had no difficulty finding that the school bus was involved in the accident for purposes of 21 Del. C. 2118, "because the bus driver, by law, controlled the process by which Buckley entered and exited the bus, and the accident occurred after the bus driver signaled her to proceed and she followed that instruction." View "State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Buckley" on Justia Law

In the underlying litigation, the Estate of Ronny Groff filed suit against Jake Weitzel alleging that Weitzel wrongful absconded with Ronny’s property and assets, causing economic loss to the Estate. Weitzel tendered this litigation to Fire Insurance Exchange (FIE) under a homeowner’s insurance policy covering claims for personal and bodily injury and property damage. FIE accepted responsibility for the litigation under a reservation of rights. FIE then filed suit in district court seeking declaratory relief, claiming that it owed no duty to defend Weitzel against the Estate under the terms of the policy. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Weitzel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred by concluding that FIE had a duty to defend Weitzel under the terms of the insurance policy. View "Fire Ins. Exchange v. Weitzel" on Justia Law

After Ashley Reed sold counterfeit Fendi goods to Burlington and others, Fendi filed suit against Ashley Reed. USF&G, Ashley Reed's insurer, filed suit against Fendi and Ashley Reed, seeking a declaration that it owed no duty under the Policies to indemnify Ashley Reed with respect to the first underlying action. Fendi asserted a counterclaim seeking indemnification for the judgment entered against Ashley Reed in the First Action.  Burlington was given permission to intervene to seek indemnification under the Policies for the judgment entered against Ashley Reed in the second underlying action. The court agreed with the district court's holding that the basis of Ashley Reedʹs liability ʺwas the sale - not the advertising - of counterfeit Fendi products,ʺ and therefore there was no basis for indemnification under the Policies. Because the losses were not the result of an advertising injury, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Fendi Adele S.R.L." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the company for interest she claimed it owed her on a payout it made on a policy. The company counterclaimed, asking for its money back because it had paid plaintiff by mistake and so plaintiff was not entitled to the payout in the first place, let alone interest. The district court granted the company summary judgment on plaintiff's claims and granted her summary judgment on the company's counterclaim. The court rejected plaintiff's argument that fraudulent concealment tolled the limitations period and held that the district court correctly found that plaintiff's claims were untimely. In regard to the cross-appeal, the court concluded that the district court erred in holding that the company's counterclaim failed because it neglected to discover all of the relevant facts, where the company has a perfectly straightforward claim for restitution in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "DeCoursey v. American General Life Ins." on Justia Law

In 2003, a closely held corporation purchased a United life insurance policy on Clark, then its President. Buck, its COO, was the beneficiary. Clark thought that the $1 million death benefit would enable Buck to buy out his stock from Clark’s family. The policy was amended so that the benefit would go to the corporation. In 2005 Clark retired and sold his interest to Holtz, the firm’s new President. Buck remained as COO. Holtz owned 61% of the stock and Buck the rest. Holtz received a copy of the policy, including the amendment naming the corporation as the beneficiary. Another copy was in corporate files. Clark died in 2011. Buck told Holtz that the company was the beneficiary, but United paid the money to Buck. When Buck tried to use the proceeds to buy Holtz’s stock, he was removed from the board and quit as COO. The corporation sued. United conceded that the corporation was the beneficiary, but argued that the corporation knew the truth and allowed Buck to claim the money, carrying out the plan devised by Clark and Buck. During discovery,the corporation then admitted finding the amendment earlier. The judge entered summary judgment in favor of United. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that Holtz was misled by United’s error and had no reason to think that the corporation was the beneficiary. The corporation’s knowledge, not Holtz’s, is dispositive. View "Samaron Corp. v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Attorney Fleisher worked for two affiliated law firms. In 2013 Fleisher filed a written demand with the firms, claiming that when he retired, in 2011, he had accrued more than 90 weeks of unused vacation time and more than 322 days of unused sick leave, and that the firms were required by contract and by the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, to pay him for those accruals. He estimated that he was owed about $950,000. The defendants sent a copy of Fleisher’s complaint to Hartford, seeking coverage under the “Employee Benefits Liability Provision” of their Business Owners Policy. It took five months for Hartford to reply that the matter was under consideration. Two months later Hartford denied coverage and sought a declaration that the insurance policy did not cover Fleisher’s claim, alleging that the failure to pay Fleisher was not the result of any negligent act, error, or omission in the administration of the employee benefits program, which was all that the policy covered. The district judge ruled that Hartford had no duty to defend under Illinois law and granted summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that delay was not a valid ground for estopping Hartford to deny coverage or a duty to defend. View "Hartford Cas. Ins. Co v. Karlin, Fleisher & Falkenberg" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her insurer, Allied, after Allied refused to pay a claim she submitted under her policy's underinsured motorist (UIM) endorsement. In this case, Allied only owed coverage when the tortfeasor met the definition of a UIM by having a policy with a limit of liability that is less than $50,000. The driver who caused the accident that injured plaintiff had a $100,000 limit of liability, the sum for which plaintiff settled her claim. Therefore, under the plain terms of the policy, the other driver did not qualify as underinsured. The court rejected plaintiff's claims to the contrary and affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Allied. View "Burger v. Allied Property & Casualty Ins." on Justia Law