Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

Citizens Insurance appealed the district court's ruling that it had a duty to defend Liberty University in an underlying action. In the underlying action, Janet Jenkins filed suit against Liberty University, alleging that the school participated in a scheme to kidnap Jenkin's daughter in order to disrupt the parent-child relationship. The court concluded that the district court erroneously interpreted the Jenkins Complaint, the Separation of Insureds provision, and Virginia law. In this case, the Jenkins Complaint does not allege an "occurrence," and it triggers the policy's coverage exclusions. Accordingly, Citizens Insurance has no duty to defendant Liberty University. The court vacated and remanded. View "Liberty Univ. v. Citizens Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 20-259.01, insurers must offer uninsured motorist (UM) and underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage to their insureds and may prove compliance by having their insureds sign a Department of Insurance (DOI) approved form selecting or rejecting such coverage. Plaintiff obtained car insurance from State Farm through Defendant, an insurance agent. Plaintiff requested that her policy include both UM and UIM coverage, but Defendant procured insurance that did not include UIM coverage. Plaintiff signed the DOI-approved form, which had been filled out by Defendant to reject UIM coverage. Plaintiff and her husband later sued Defendant for malpractice for failing to procure the insurance coverage they had requested. The trial court concluded that Defendant’s compliance with section 20-259.01 demonstrated that it fulfilled its duties to Plaintiff regarding the offer of UM/UIM coverage, and therefore, Defendant breached no duty owed to Plaintiffs. The court of appeals reversed, holding that section 20-259.01(B) did not abolish the common law duty of reasonable care insurance agents owe their clients. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that compliance with section 20-259.01 does not bar a negligence claim alleging that the insurance agent failed to procure the UIM coverage requested by the insured. View "Wilks v. Manobianco" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Lincoln seeking to recover damages for the injuries they incurred from the insured. The court certified the following question to the Supreme Court of California: When determining whether an injury arises out of the “use” of a vehicle for purposes of determining coverage under an automobile insurance policy and an insurance company’s duty to defend, is the appropriate test whether the vehicle was a “predominating cause/substantial factor” or whether there was a “minimal causal connection” between the vehicle and the injury? View "Gradillas v. Lincoln General Ins." on Justia Law

Ray Dillard attempted to collect workers' compensation benefits from the president and majority shareholder of his employer. In 1997, The Commission held that Dillard suffered a compensable injury. After the mandate issues, one of Dillard's attorneys filed a lis pendens notice regarding several parcels of real property the company's president owned. Because none of that property belonged to the company itself, Dillard's attorney informed the president that it was asking the Commission to hold the president personally liable for Dillard's benefits because the company failed to carry workers' compensation insurance. Dillard died in 2005 while unresolved issues regarding who would ultimately be responsible for Dillard's benefits was pending before an administrative law judge. Dillard's estate filed a complaint at the circuit court against the president and company, claiming that the company was required to carry workers' compensation insurance but failed to do so. Therefore, the Estate argued the president was personally liable for Dillard's benefits. Among other things, the president argued that the Estate's claim was barred by the statute of limitations and the doctrine of res judicata. Eventually, the administrative law judge granted the Estate's renewed motion for summary judgment, and entered a judgment of approximately $223,000 against the president and the company "jointly and individually." The president appealed, and the case was assigned to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court held that Dillard's claim against the company president was barred by res judicata and the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court held the Court of Appeals erred in reaching that conclusion, reversed and reinstated the trial court's judgment in favor of Dillard. View "Jarrett v. Dillard" on Justia Law

Milton Harper, the managing partner and president of Banks, Finley, White & Company of Mississippi (“Banks”), suffered a severe stroke in August 2000, and died of another stroke in July 2001. His dependents sued Banks for workers’ compensation benefits. The administrative law judge and the Workers’ Compensation Commission held that Harper’s injuries and death arose out of the scope and course of his employment at Banks. On appeal, the circuit court agreed that substantial evidence in the record supported the Commission’s conclusion that Harper’s stroke arose out of his employment, but that court held that Harper’s dependents were barred from recovering workers’ compensation benefits because Harper had failed to obtain workers’ compensation insurance for Banks. In turn, the Court of Appeals in "Harper v. Banks, Finley, White & Co. of Mississippi," (136 So. 3d 462 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014)), held that Harper’s dependents were not barred from recovery because Section 71-3-79 of the Mississippi Code allowed members of partnerships to exempt themselves from workers’ compensation coverage by giving notice in writing. Because Harper had not opted out of coverage in writing, the Court of Appeals held that Banks was required to provide workers’ compensation benefits to Harper’s beneficiaries. On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in applying Section 71-3-79 of the Mississippi Code to the facts of this case. Because Banks did not have workers’ compensation insurance coverage, there was no coverage for Harper to opt out of in writing as contemplated by Section 71-3-79. Instead, the Court held that Section 71-3-52 of the Mississippi Code controlled the analysis of this case: because Banks had more than five employees, it was required to obtain workers’ compensation insurance and provide workers’ compensation benefits to its employees. The Court affirmed the Workers’ Compensation Commission’s finding that Harper suffered a fatal injury through the course of his employment at Banks was supported by substantial evidence. View "Harper v. Banks, Finley, White & Co. of Mississippi, P.C." on Justia Law

Jeffrey Epp suffered severe injuries after diving into a swimming pool at the St. Regis Resort, Monarch Beach. Epp and his wife sued the owner of the St. Regis and the entities involved in the design and construction of the swimming pool. The defendants included Valley Crest Landscape Development, Inc. (the general contractor for exterior improvements at the St. Regis), and Mission Pools of Escondido, Inc. (the subcontractor that built the swimming pool). Summary judgment motions and settlements reduced the litigation to a cross-complaint by Valley Crest and its insurer, National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA, against Mission Pools. Valley Crest sought to recover the amount it spent in the litigation based on a claim of express indemnity under the terms of the subcontract with Mission Pools. National Union sought to recover attorney fees and costs it had spent for Valley Crest’s defense and settlement of the Epps’ claims pursuant to the policy of general liability insurance that National Union had issued to Valley Crest. National Union proceeded on a claim it was equitably subrogated to Valley Crest’s claims against Mission Pools. The trial court conducted a two-part bench trial on the cross-complaint, found in favor of both Valley Crest and National Union on their respective claims, and awarded them the full amount of recovery sought. In this appeal, Mission Pools argued: (1) the cross-complaint was time-barred under Code of Civil Procedure, section 337.1, subdivision (a); (2) the trial court erred by finding National Union could recover on its claim for equitable subrogation because, under the element of balancing the equities, National Union should have borne the loss; and (3) the trial court erred by denying Mission Pools a jury trial on Valley Crest’s claim for express indemnity. As to the first contention, the Court of Appeal concluded section 337.1(a) did not apply to claims for express indemnity, and, therefore, the first amended cross-complaint was timely. As to the second contention, the Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that National Union was entitled to recover based on equitable subrogation. The trial court erred, however, by denying Mission Pools a jury trial on Valley Crest’s claim for express indemnity. The Court therefore reversed on that claim and remanded for further proceedings. The Court affirmed in all other respects. View "Valley Crest Landscape v. Mission Pools" on Justia Law

Dakota Trailer Manufacturing, which makes radiator components for an unrelated company, performs its component work in one of Dakota Trailer’s locations that was originally classified as a “machine shop” for workers compensation insurance rating purposes. After an inspection, the National Council on Compensation Insurance changed the location’s classification to “welding or cutting.” Both the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board and the South Dakota Department of Labor affirmed the new classification. The circuit court reversed and reinstated the machine shop code. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court properly found that Dakota Trailer’s activities fit within the machine shop code. View "Dakota Trailer Mfg. v. United Fire & Cas. Co." on Justia Law

An employee at a boiler manufacturing plant sustained permanent hearing loss as a result of his employment. Between the time he was injured and the time he filed his workers’ compensation claim, the plant changed ownership. Twin City Fire Insurance Company insured the plant for the previous owner, and American Insurance Company insured the new owner. Counsel representing American mistakenly believed that American had insured the plant during the time of the injury, and Twin City was not given notice of the claim until after entry of an award. The new owner of the plant filed a declaratory judgment action against the previous owner and both insurers to determine who was liable for payment of the award. The district court determined that Twin City was liable for the employee’s workers’ compensation award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding that Twin City was liable for the award, in rejecting Twin City’s equitable defenses, and in dismissing Twin City’s counterclaims. View "Cleaver-Brooks Inc. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Prentice Delon Hyler sought health care services from Action Chiropractic Clinic, LLC (Plaintiff) after she was injured in an automobile accident. Hyler executed an “Assignment of Rights” to Plaintiff for medical benefits payable to Hyler by Erie Insurance Exchange. Erie was the automobile liability insurance provider for the opposing driver involved in the accident. Erie and Hyler entered into a settlement agreement providing that Erie would pay Hyler $8,510 for claims relating to the accident. Plaintiff sued both Erie and Hyler seeking to recover the $5,010 it was owed from Hyler. The trial court granted Erie’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the Assignment of Rights was not a valid assignment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the assignment in this case was ineffective. View "Action Chiropractic Clinic, LLC v. Hyler" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held in Matter of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Amato that N.Y. Ins. Law 3420(f), which provides that all motor vehicle insurance policies must contain uninsured motorist coverage, has no application to police vehicles. Here, Respondent, a police officer, was injured when the driver of an underinsured vehicle struck the police car in which Respondent was a passenger and Michael Knauss was the driver. Knauss maintained an automobile liability insurance policy issued by State Farm that included a supplementary uninsured/underinsured motorist (SUM) endorsement. Respondent made a demand upon State Farm for underinsured motorist arbitration under the SUM endorsement of Knauss’s policy. State Farm refused payment, asserting that a police vehicle was not a covered “motor vehicle” within the meaning of the SUM endorsement. Supreme Court concluded that Knauss’s policy did not cover Respondent. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that Amato was inapplicable to SUM coverage mandated by section 3420(f)(2) and defining “motor vehicle” for purposes of statutorily required SUM coverage as inclusive of police vehicles. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) a police vehicle is not a “motor vehicle” covered by a SUM endorsement under section 3420(f)(2)(a); and (2) Amato remains binding precedent in this matter of statutory interpretation. View "Matter of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fitzgerald" on Justia Law