Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

Endeavor and Basic entered into a master services agreement (MSA) containing an indemnity provision in which they agreed to cover any liability resulting from claims brought by their own employees, even if the other party was at fault. Ironshore, Endeavor's excess insurer, subsequently filed suit against Basic's excess insurers for a declaratory judgment, contending that Basic's insurers are obligated to provide coverage up to the full limits of their policies because the policies do not expressly limit the coverage available to an additional insured like Endeavor. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in In re Deepwater Horizon, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants because Basic was only "obliged" to procure $5 million in insurance. The court interpreted Deepwater Horizon to hold that the "Insured Contract" provision, standing alone, was a sufficient ground to incorporate the Drilling Contract's limitation on coverage for above-surface pollution. View "Ironshore Specialty Ins Co. v. Aspen Underwriting" on Justia Law

The Delaware Supreme Court certified two questions of New York law to the New York Court of Appeals. This case was a consolidated appeal in an insurance-coverage dispute from separate trial court judgments by the Delaware Court of Chancery and the Delaware Superior Court. Viking Pump, Inc. and Warren Pumps, LLC sought to recover under policies issued to Houdaille Industries, Inc. Viking claimed it was the successor to insurance policies that Liberty Mutual Insurance Company issued to Houdaille, or in the alternative, sought partition of the Liberty policy limits. Liberty, Viking and Warrant settled their dispute, but Viking and Warren then filed new complaints in the Court of Chancery against more than twenty other insurers that had issued excess policies to Houdaille. The Court of Chancery held that Houdaille's policies unambiguously provided for an all sums allocation. The case was then transferred to the Superior Court to determine several other issues. That court held that as a matter of New York law, Viking and Warren were obligated to horizontally exhaust all triggered "primary and umbrella insurance layers before tapping" any of Houdaille's excess coverage. The legal insurers in this appeal were controlled by New York law. As such, the Delaware Supreme Court certified two questions of New York law to the New York Court of Appeals, centering on the proper method of allocation and interpretation of the policies at issue here. View "In Re Viking Pump, Inc." on Justia Law

Alem Cardenas received treatment for injuries he received during an automobile accident at the office of Plaintiff-medical provider. Cardenas’s automobile liability insurance policy with Defendant-insurer contained a New York State no-fault endorsement. Cardenas assigned his right to receive no-fault benefits to Plaintiff. Plaintiff later commenced this action seeking to recover no-fault insurance benefits, asserting that it timely submitted bills and claims for payment but that Defendant had not made any payments or denied the requests. Defendant asserted as an affirmative defense that payment for Plaintiff’s claims was not overdue because Plaintiff failed to submit “proper proof of the fact and amount of the loss” as required by the Insurance Law. The Appellate Division granted summary judgment for Plaintiff with respect to all the claims that were not timely denied by Defendant, concluding that Plaintiff established prima facie entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Appellate Division properly determined that Plaintiff met its prima facie summary judgment burden. View "Viviane Etienne Med. Care v. Country-Wide Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Jerry Earl sustained severe injuries in a motorcycle accident. Jerry had a policy with State Farm, which provided uninsured motorist coverage. Earl and his wife Kimberly (together, Plaintiffs) sued State Farm when State Farm refused to pay out the full amount under the policy. State Farm admitted liability, and the case proceeded to a jury on the question of damages. The jury returned a verdict of $250,000, the exact amount of the coverage limit. State Farm appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the coverage limit into evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the coverage limit. View "State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Earl" on Justia Law

A driver for Medford Trucking, LLC was injured while his truck was being loaded with coal by employees of Elk Run Coal Co. The driver sued Elk Run. A hauling and delivery agreement between Elk Run and Medford contained an indemnification clause that required Medford to purchase insurance. Accordingly, Medford purchased insurance from four different insurance companies. Elk Run asserted a third-party complaint against the insurers seeking a declaration that there was insurance coverage for the plaintiff’s claim against Elk Run under the policies. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment for the insurance companies, and Elk Run’s third-party complaints against the insurers were dismissed with prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded, holding that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to two of the insurers. Remanded. View "Elk Run Coal Co. v. Canopius US Ins., Inc." on Justia Law

Capital City filed suit against Underwriters, seeking a declaration that Underwriters were obligated to defend and indemnify it against a negligence suit. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Underwriters. The court concluded, however, that the plain language of the Endorsement to the policy creates a duty to defend Capital City where Capital City is being held liable for the acts or omissions of a subcontractor; the allegations in the underlying complaint create a potentiality of coverage; and therefore, the court vacated the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the Underwriters and remanded for further proceedings. View "Capital City Real Estate v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London" on Justia Law

The Parish filed suit against Kiker, alleging that Kiker breached the implied warranty in the parties' contract to repair Parish's roof using reasonable skill. At issue was whether Penn National has a duty to indemnify its insured, Kiker, with respect to a judgment Parish obtained against Kiker for breach of contract. The court concluded that, because the conduct that caused damage to the Parish was accidental, the damage is covered under the policy. The court also held that the contractual liability exclusion is inapplicable in this case and therefore, the district court erred in granting Penn National's summary judgment motion and denying the Parish's motion. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Pennsylvania Nat'l Mutual Cas. Ins. Co. v. St. Catherine of Sienna Parish" on Justia Law

The estate of a former resident of Charlesgate Nursing Center filed a civil action against Charlesgate and related defendants (collectively, Charlesgate), claiming that the former resident was the victim of a sexual assault perpetrated by employees at Charlesgate. During the relevant time period, Charlesgate was insured by Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Association of Rhode Island (JUA). The JUA filed the instant action seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend the Charlesgate defendants against the allegations set forth in the estate’s complaint. Charlesgate counterclaimed requesting a declaratory judgment establishing that the JUA owed a duty to defend Charlesgate in the action by the estate. The superior court granted summary judgment for Charlesgate with respect to the declaratory-judgment count of its counterclaim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the JUA had a duty to defend Charlesgate in the estate’s underlying suit. View "Med. Malpractice Joint Underwriting Ass’n of R.I. v. Charlesgate Nursing Center, L.P." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured from an automobile accident. A hospital toxicology report indicated that Plaintiff had a blood alcohol concentration of .25 two hours after the accident. Plaintiff submitted a claim to American Family Life Assurance Company of Columbus (AFLAC) pursuant to his hospital intensive care policy. AFLAC denied the claim under the policy’s intoxication exclusion, relying in part on the hospital toxicology report. Plaintiff filed suit seeking coverage under the policy. AFLAC moved to admit a copy of the toxicology report. Plaintiff objected, citing a lack of foundation. The district court sustained Plaintiff’s objection. After a trial, the district court concluded that Plaintiff was entitled to coverage under the policy because AFLAC failed to prove that Plaintiff’s accident was in consequence of his intoxication. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in determining that AFLAC had satisfied the appropriate foundation requirements to admit the hospital’s toxicology report; (2) AFLAC failed to meet its burden of establishing that Plaintiff’s claim was excluded under the policy; and (3) the district court erred in determining that AFLAC’s denial of coverage was without just cause or excuse. View "Wiles v. Am. Family Life Assurance Co." on Justia Law

In this insurance matter, the district court entered a final judgment and a post-judgment order. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the district court. After the time for filing a petition for rehearing expired and no petition for rehearing was filed, the remittitur issued. Three days later, Appellants’ counsel filed a motion to recall the remittitur, claiming that he did not become aware of the order of affirmance due to technical difficulties created by a virus on counsel’s servers “as well as switching to a new case management system.” However, the court’s electronic record reflected that an official notice of the order of affirmance was sent to Appellants’ counsel’s electronic filing account, and an email was sent to two separate email addresses at Appellants’ counsel’s law firm. The Supreme Court denied the motion, holding that because Appellants’ counsel could have learned of the disposition in time to timely file a petition for rehearing, Appellants failed to demonstrate a basis on which the remittitur should be recalled. View "Fulbrook v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law