Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

In 2013, Plaintiff, a private middle school in Canaan, New Hampshire, received a demand letter asserting a claim concerning events that allegedly occurred during the 1967-1968 academic year. In response, Plaintiff asked Defendant, an insurance company, to defend against the claim under an insurance policy that Defendant allegedly issued to Plaintiff nearly fifty years ago. Defendant rejected the request on the grounds that it had not been able to locate any policy covering the school for the relevant time period. Plaintiff filed suit seeking a judgment adjudicating and decreeing the existence of, and Plaintiff’s rights under, the policy issued by Defendant. The case was removed to federal district court. The district court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss the suit for failure to state claim, concluding that the school’s complaint did not plausibly show the existence of the policy. The First Circuit reversed, holding that Plaintiff’s complaint proved a plausible basis, beyond a mere possibility, for believing Defendant issued the policy in question. Remanded. View "Cardigan Mountain Sch. v. N.H. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

At issue in these two consolidated civil cases was the circumstances under which an insurer providing uninsured (UM) motorist coverage may disclaim any such liability owed to its insured. In these cases, Petitioners sued their UM carriers for breach of contract. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgments in favor of the UM carriers in both cases, concluding that Petitioners’ failure to comply with the statutory UM coverage settlement procedures were fatal to their claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Court of Special Appeals did not err in concluding that (1) the UM carrier did not waive its right to receive written notice of a pending settlement with the tortfeasor’s insurance carrier even where there was unequivocal testimony from Petitioner’s counsel that he received oral consent to settle from a UM carrier claims representative; and (2) the UM carrier did not bear the burden of proving prejudice arising from Petitioners’ failure to give written notice of the pending settlement with the tortfeasors’ insurance carrier. View "Woznicki v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Marian Davis lost control of her vehicle and struck a vehicle driven by Amy Locke. At the time of the accident, Davis was insured by Safeco Insurance Company under a policy with a $100,000 per person coverage. Davis died from her injuries. Locke, who also sustained injuries, filed a claim for damages against Davis’s estate. Prior to trial, Safeco paid Locke $16,306 for her past medical expenses. After a trial, the jury awarded Locke $400,000 in compensation for her injuries. The Estate appealed, and Safeco intervened. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part, holding that the district court (1) abused its discretion in denying the Estate’s motion to alter or amend the judgment because Locke was precluded from recovering against the Estate more than the $100,000 insurance limitation; and (2) did not abuse its discretion when it made findings and conclusions that effectively bound Safeco to a judgment in a case in which Safeco was not a named party, was not represented by counsel, and did not appear. View "Locke v. Estate of Davis" on Justia Law

Allstate Insurance Company petitioned for review of a court of appeals' judgment that reversed the dismissal of a breach of assignment claim brought by Medical Lien Management (MLM). The district court effectively construed MLM's Lien and Security Agreement with a motor vehicle accident victim (upon which the underlying complaint was premised), as failing to assign the victim's right to the proceeds of his personal injury lawsuit against Allstate's insured. The court of appeals found a valid assignment to MLM all rights to the future proceeds from the personal injury claim in an amount equal to the costs of medical services paid for by MLM, as well as a sufficient allegation in the complaint of an enforceable obligation by Allstate to pay the assigned sums to MLM. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the court of appeals erred in finding the purported assignment in this case. View "Allstate Insurance Co. v. Medical Lien Management, Inc." on Justia Law

Daniel attended a birthday party for a St. Louis County police officer at Gannon's tavern, as an invited guest. Following a confrontation between Lammert and another in the parking lot, Lammert hit Daniel, then drove his vehicle out to the street, running over Daniel's body. Daniel died from complications due to the injuries. Lammert turned himself into the police and pleaded guilty to manslaughter and leaving-the-scene charges, claiming that he thought Daniel was out of the way. In state court premises liability and dram shop claims against Gannon's, its liquor liability insurer defended the dram shop claims, but the general commercial liability insurer, Atain, refused to defend and declined to participate in mediation. Gannon's settled, assigned its claims against Atain, and agreed to a $2 million consent judgment on the premises liability action. The estate sued Atain, alleging equitable garnishment and vexatious failure to defend and indemnify. Atain cited an exclusion precluding coverage for injuries caused by automobiles and an assault and battery exclusion. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the estate on the equitable garnishment claim, finding that the exclusions did not apply, but granted Atain summary judgment the vexatious-refusal-to-defend claim, finding that the exclusions arguably could have applied and coverage was a close call. View "Minden v. Atain Specialty Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Fidelity, alleging numerous federal and state law claims after Fidelity denied flood insurance coverage. In this interlocutory appeal, Fidelity sought review of the district court's denial of its motion for summary judgment. In light of binding precedent, the court concluded that plaintiff's state-law causes are not preempted by federal law to the extent that they are insurance procurement claims, but claims that pertain to or arise out of “claims handling” after the policy issued are preempted. The court further concluded that, even though not preempted, certain claims cannot succeed as a matter of law. Accordingly, the denial of Fidelity's motion for summary judgment was erroneous in part and the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Spong v. Fidelity Nat'l Prop. & Cas. Ins." on Justia Law

Here the Court of Appeals decided whether to overrule Allied Inv. Corp. v. Jasen, in which the Court held that a defendant does not convert a plaintiff’s intangible property where the defendant does not convert a document that embodies the plaintiff’s right to the plaintiff’s intangible property. In this case involving a life insurance policy a jury found Defendant, an insurance broker, liable for negligence, negligent misrepresentation, deceit, conversion, and constructive fraud. The Court of Special Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that Plaintiffs failed to establish claims for conversion and constructive fraud. Plaintiffs appealed, urging the Court of Appeals to overrule Jasen and arguing that a defendant converts a plaintiff’s intangible property by interfering with the plaintiff’s right to the the intangible property, even if the defendant does not convert a document that embodies the plaintiff’s right to the plaintiff’s intangible property. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the circuit court erred in denying Defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to conversion, as Defendant did not convert the life insurance policy, and as to constructive fraud, as Plaintiffs failed to establish that the parties were in a confidential relationship. View "Thompson v. UBS Fin. Servs." on Justia Law

Troy Dowling, the operator of a crop-spraying business, owned a John Deere sprayer that was a scheduled item on his commercial general liability insurance policy through Berkley Regional Insurance Company. Dowling also had a commercial automobile insurance policy with Great West Casualty Company. Dowling had borrowed a different sprayer and was driving the sprayer to one of his customer’s fields when the sprayer collided with a motorcycle. James and Kimberly Seiler, who were both seriously injured in the collision, sought damages. The circuit court granted declaratory judgments for Berkley and Great West, concluding that the insurers had no duty to defend or indemnify Dowling. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for Berkley and reversed and remanded the judgment for Great West, holding (1) under the terms of Dowling’s policy with Berkley, Berkley had no duty to defend or indemnify Dowling for any claims arising from the accident; and (2) under the terms of Dowling’s policy with Great West, Great West had the duty to defend and indemnify Dowling for claims related to the accident. View "Berkley Reg’l Specialty Ins. Co. v. Dowling Spray Serv." on Justia Law

Zup’s owned a strip mall in Babbitt, Minnesota, where it operated a supermarket and rented space to other businesses. When the strip mall burned down in 2011, Zup’s lost income from its supermarket as well as rent from its tenants. Zup’s had two relevant insurance policies, one from Security National and one from West Bend. Zup’s sought payment from Security for the lost supermarket income and payment from West Bend for the lost rent. Security learned of the West Bend policy and concluded that West Bend also had insured and was primarily liable for the lost supermarket income. The district court determined that West Bend was not liable for lost supermarket income. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The West Bend policy did not mention supermarkets or charge supermarket-specific premiums. The phrase “lessor’s risk only” appeared on the declarations page. Because West Bend’s policy was secondary to Security’s, West Bend need pay only if Security National’s coverage was exhausted. View "Zup's of Babbitt-Aurora, Inc. v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

American Towers LLC hired BPI, Inc., a West Virginia contractor, to construct a cell tower and cell tower compound in Kentucky. The access road collapsed within one year after the completion of the project. American Towers filed a civil action against BPI. BPI filed a cross-claim against Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, claiming that BPI’s potential liability was covered under the commercial general liability policy it had purchased from Nationwide. Nationwide sought a declaration that it was not obligated to insure BPI for this incident. The determinative issues in this case depended upon the application of West Virginia law regarding BPI’s insurance policy covering property damage caused by an “occurrence.” Under Cherrington v. Erie Insurance Property & Casualty Co., issued by the Supreme Court after American Towers filed the underlying civil action against BPI, held that defective workmanship may qualify as an occurrence, allowing resulting damages to be covered under a policy such as the policy at issue in this case. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky requested the Supreme Court to answer the question of whether the decision in Cherrington applies retroactively. The Supreme Court held that Cherrington applies retroactively. Remanded. View "BPI, Inc. v. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law