Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

During a highway paving project a storm caused recently applied primer to emulsify in rainwater. The oil splashed onto passing vehicles, causing damage. The vehicle owners brought claims against the State, which the State paid. A.M. Welles, Inc. (Welles), the general contractor on the job, reimbursed the State for what it paid to the vehicle owners. The State then sued Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. (Liberty), the insurer for the job, seeking indemnification for the costs that Welles did not cover. Welles, in turn, sued the subcontractors for the project, Montana Materials, Inc., RSJ, Inc., and GLJ, Inc. (collectively, “Jensen”), seeking indemnification under the subcontract. The district court granted summary judgment for Jensen on Welles’s indemnification claim and dismissed the State’s action against Liberty for failure to prosecute. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded, holding that the district court (1) erred in denying Welles’s motion for summary judgment, as Welles was entitled to indemnification under the subcontract; and (2) abused its discretion by dismissing the State’s action against Liberty for failure to prosecute. Remanded. View "A.M. Welles, Inc. v. Mont. Materials, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellees in these consolidated appeals challenged under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) the requirement under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) that contraceptive coverage be provided to their plan participants and beneficiaries. Appellees included a nonprofit institution of higher learning established by the Reformed Presbyterian Church and certain Catholic Dioceses and nonprofit organizations affiliated with the Catholic Church. Because they provided coverage to the Catholic nonprofits, the Dioceses, which were otherwise exempt, were required to comply with the contraceptive coverage requirement as to the nonprofits. The nonprofit appellees were eligible for an accommodation to the contraceptive coverage requirement, under which the contraceptive services will be independently provided by an insurance issuer or third-party administrator once the appellees advise that they will not pay for those services. Appellees argued that the accommodation places a substantial burden on their religious exercise because it forces them to facilitate the provision of insurance coverage for contraceptive services and has the impermissible effect of dividing the Catholic Church. The district courts granted Appellees’ motions for a preliminary injunction. The Third Circuit reversed, concluding that the accommodation places no substantial burden on Appellees, and therefore, Appellees did not show a likelihood of success on the merits of their RFRA claim. View "Geneva College v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

Argonaut filed suit against ACJC, alleging that ACJC's negligence in monitoring a security alarm panel caused or contributed to damages arising out of the burglary and fire of a grocery store insured by Argonaut. The district court denied summary judgment to ACJC, finding that ACJC had waived its sovereign and statutory immunity by purchasing insurance. ACJC filed an interlocutory appeal. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to address the question whether ACJC's purchase of insurance also waived any statutory immunity it might enjoy under Section 190.307 of the Missouri Revised Statutes as a 911 call center where the statute does not extend to ACJC a substantive right to be free from the burdens of litigation. The court found no clear error in the district court's determination that ACJC did not prove the existence of a pre-existing agreement between itself and the insurer to include the sovereign immunity endorsement with the original policy. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's determination that ACJC waived the common law sovereign immunity provided by Section 537.600 of the Missouri Revised Statutes through its purchase of insurance. The court dismissed the remaining portions of the interlocutory appeal based on lack of jurisdiction. View "Argonaut Great Central Ins. v. Audrain Cnty. Joint Commc'n" on Justia Law

Alabama Mutual Insurance Corporation ("AMIC") appealed the trial court's order certifying a class in the action filed by the City of Vernon and a class of similarly situated entities that had purchased uninsured motorist/underinsured-motorist coverage ("UM/UIM coverage") from AMIC. Vernon was the original class representative; however, after AMIC filed its notice of appeal of the class-certification order, Vernon settled its claims against AMIC and withdrew as the class representative. Because there was no longer a representative to "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class," the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the trial court for a new class representative to be substituted for Vernon. The City of Fairfield substituted for Vernon as the class representative. After review of the parties' arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the underlying dispute: the Court concluded that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over this dispute. Initial jurisdiction over this dispute was with the Alabama Department of Insurance and its commissioner. Therefore, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's class-certification order, and remanded for dismissal. View "Alabama Mutual Insurance Corporation v. City of Fairfield" on Justia Law

The Bank filed a claim with Travelers for the loss incurred with a long-time customer's default. The customer had pledged various assets as collateral for a loan including stock certificates representing shares in The Securance Group. The court held that, under Alabama law, a financial institution bond's definition of "counterfeit" - "an imitation which is intended to deceive and to be taken as an original" - does not encompass a duly authorized stock certificate procured under false pretenses. In this case, Certificate No. 11 at issue was fraudulently procured and, as such, valueless, it was an authentic document and thus not "counterfeit" under the terms of the bond. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Travelers. View "Bank of Brewton v. The Travelers Companies" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who worked for United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS) for thirty-two years, was diagnosed with diabetes in 1987 and with diabetic neuropathy in 1998. The diabetic neuropathy caused impairment to his arms and hands. In 2003, Plaintiff suffered injuries to his upper arms and hands in a work-related accident. After Plaintiff retired in 2008 he filed a claim for benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Commissioner apportioned the payment so that Defendants, UPS and its insurer, paid only for the proportion of disability attributed to Plaintiff’s occupational injuries rather than pay the entirety of Plaintiff’s permanent partial disability to his upper extremities and hands. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed. The Appellate Court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a disability arising from a progressive nonoccupational condition - such as Plaintiff’s diabetes and diabetic neuropathy - that manifests prior to an occupational injury and that further disables the same body part is a compensable preexisting injury rather than a noncompensable concurrently developing disease under the apportionment rule established in Deschenes v. Transco, Inc. View "Sullins v. United Parcel Serv., Inc." on Justia Law

Daer filed a personal injury suit, alleging material and design defects in a tire manufactured by Yokohama and sold by Costco. Costco settled for $5.5 million and Yokohama for $1.1 million. National, as excess insurer of Costco, sued Yokohama and its insurers (Tokio) to recover the costs of defending plus money paid on behalf of Costco to settle that lawsuit. National, as subrogee of Costco, sought recovery based on an express indemnity provision in the supplier agreement between Costco and Yokohama, and alleged breach of Yokohama’s contractual insurance obligations. It sued Tokio for indemnity and contribution. The court ruled in limine that National’s proof of a tire defect would be limited to the opinions of Daer’s expert in the underlying case. After National made its opening statement in a proceeding to determine whether a tire defect was a cause of Daer’s accident, the court dismissed the express indemnity claim. Having determined that the tire was not defective, the court granted summary adjudication as to claims based on refusal to defend and Yokohama’s breach of insurance obligations. The court awarded Yokohama $863,706.75 in fees as the prevailing party on the indemnity claim. The court of appeal reversed in part, holding that the court erred in excluding relevant, material expert evidence on a matter properly subject to expert opinion. View "Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Tokio Marine & Nichido Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Footstar operated the footwear departments in various Kmart stores as though they were islands. Footstar employees could only work in those departments unless they had written permission from Kmart. In 2005, a Footstar employee tried to help a customer get an infant carrier off a shelf outside the footwear department and the customer was injured. She sued. Kmart sought indemnification from Footstar and its insurer, Liberty Mutual. A magistrate judge found that Footstar and Liberty Mutual both had a duty to defend beginning the day Kmart formally requested coverage since the injury was potentially coverable under the agreement between Kmart and Footstar and the insurance policy. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that neither Liberty Mutual nor Footstar had a duty to indemnify Kmart because the injury did not occur “pursuant to” or “under” the agreement between Kmart and Footstar. That agreement specifically precluded Footstar employees from working outside of the footwear department, where the injury occurred, and actions taken in contravention of the agreement were not “pursuant to” or “under” it. Liberty Mutual did not deny coverage in bad faith and that Kmart did not breach the relevant notice provisions such that Liberty Mutual and Footstar could withhold defense costs. View "Kmart Corp. v. Footstar, Inc." on Justia Law

Barbara Hiles purchased two American Family Mutual Insurance policies on two vehicles she owned, a Nissan and a Ford. While driving her Nissan, Hiles was involved in a motor vehicle accident that injured Adam Dutton. Dutton sued Hiles and made a settlement demand of $50,000, which was the combined policy limits of the Nissan policy added to what Dutton claimed were the minimum policy limits required under the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL) for the Ford policy. Dutton, Hiles, and American Family entered into a settlement under which Dutton received $25,000 under the Nissan policy and was assigned Hiles’ right to sue American Family for issues arising from the Ford policy. Dutton then filed a declaratory judgment action against American Family seeking a determination whether the Ford policy provided $25,000 additional coverage for his injuries. The trial court entered judgment for American Family. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Ford policy’s plain language did not require American Family to provide coverage for the accident, and the MVFRL did not require American Family to pay the statutory minimum of $25,000 of liability coverage on the Ford policy because the Nissan was owned by the insured but not designated in the Ford policy. View "Dutton vs. American Family Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Improper transfers were made from a title insurance agent’s escrow account. The agent’s principal, United General Title Insurance Company, paid the loss and then sued to recover the loss from multiple entities and persons, including recipients of the transferred funds. United General recovered judgment against some entities and persons, but summary judgment was entered against it on various claims. After a jury trial, several recipients of the transferred funds successfully defended the action on the remaining issues. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the district court correctly granted summary judgment, with the exception of United General’s claims for conversion and a constructive trust; (2) there was no merit to the alleged errors that United General asserted occurred at trials; and (3) after trial, the district court correctly granted a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. View "United Gen. Title Ins. Co. v. Malone" on Justia Law