Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

A California resident owned an apartment building in Arkansas that was insured by a Michigan insurance company under a policy the owner obtained through an insurance agent in Arkansas. That policy included commercial property coverage for the Arkansas apartment building and commercial general liability coverage for the owner's property ownership business, which he operated from California. Other than writing this policy, the insurer did no business in California. Both the commercial property coverage and the commercial general liability coverage in the policy covered some risks, losses, or damages that could have arisen in California, but the dispute at issue here arose out of two fires that damaged the building in Arkansas. Initially, the insurer agreed to treat the two fires as separate losses but later reversed its position and took the position that both incidents were subject to only a single policy limit payment. As a result, the owner sued the insurer in a California state court for breach of contract and bad faith. The issue presented for the Court of Appeal's review was, under these circumstances, did the insurer have sufficient minimum contacts with California to allow the state court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the company in this action? The Court concluded the answer was "no." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's order granting the insurance company's motion to quash the service of summons. View "Greenwell v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co." on Justia Law

A tractor-trailer was involved in an auto collision that caused serious bodily injury. The owner of the tractor (Owner) obtained primary insurance for the tractor through Old Republic Insurance Company (Old Republic). The operator of the tractor (Operator) obtained separate insurance through Stratford Insurance Company (Stratford). Old Republic filed suit against Stratford seeking a determination as to Stratford’s insurance obligations. The First Circuit (1) affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the Operator and Stratford never intended Stratford to provide primary coverage to the tractor, leaving Old Republic as the primary insurer and Stratford as the excess insurer; and (2) as to the question regarding Stratford’s duty to defend as an excess insurer of the tractor, the best course of action is to certify this question of New Hampshire law to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. View "Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Stratford Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In consolidated cases for this opinion, plaintiffs filed separate actions against Farmers Insurance Exchange (Farmers) in district court. In each case, Farmers moved the change venue, alleging that a change would promote "the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice." Farmers supported it motions with attorney affidavits that purported to demonstrate (based on Google Maps printouts) that the transferee court was more convenient for plaintiffs and their medical providers. The trial court granted the motions for transfer in all three cases. Plaintiffs appealed the trial court's ruling, arguing that judges within the same district applied C.R.C.P. 98(f)(2) inconsistently, and that venue should have been transferred back to the initial district court. Recognizing a need to promote a uniform application of the venue rules, the Supreme Court issues rules to show cause. The Court held that the trial courts abused their discretion when they changed venue in all three cases. Consequently, the transferee courts were directed to return the cases to the original district court. View "In re Hagan v. Farmers Insurance Exchange" on Justia Law

After being injured in an automobile accident, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the other driver, who was uninsured. At the time of the accident, Plaintiff owned an insurance policy with Farmers Insurance Exchange. Farmers intervened in the lawsuit, thus becoming a defendant. The parties later stipulated to dismissing the uninsured driver. Farmers sought to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause in Plaintiff’s policy. The district court granted Farmers’ motion and dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff petitioned the Supreme Court for interlocutory review of the district court’s order. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, concluding that because Plaintiff had not filed a notice of appeal, the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider her case. View "McGibbon v. Farmers Ins. Exch." on Justia Law

An adult passenger in a car was injured in a single-car accident. The passenger and his family brought suit against the vehicle’s unlicensed minor driver, the minor’s mother, the owner of the car, the insurance policy holder, the insurer, and the insurance adjuster who handled the claims arising from the accident. The passenger’s father attempted to raise a contractual interference claim, but the superior court concluded that the complaint did not state such a claim on his behalf. The superior court dismissed the father’s only other claim (intentional infliction of emotional distress), removed the father’s name from the case caption, and ordered the father to cease filing pleadings on behalf of other parties. After the superior court judge dismissed him from the action, the passenger’s father attempted to file a first amended complaint, which expressly stated his contractual interference claim on the theory that he was a third-party beneficiary of the contracts between his son and his son’s doctors. But the superior court denied the father leave to amend the complaint because the father had already been dismissed from the case. Following a settlement among all of the other plaintiffs and defendants (which the father did not join) the superior court granted final judgment to the insurer. The insurer moved for attorney’s fees against the father under Alaska Civil Rule 82, but the father never responded to that motion. The superior court granted the award without soliciting a response from the father, and the father appealed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s order dismissing the father’s claims and denying leave to amend the complaint because the proposed first amended complaint was futile. But because the superior court had barred the father from filing any further pleadings in the case and had removed his name from the caption, the superior court had a responsibility to inform the self-represented father that he was permitted to file an opposition to the motion for attorney’s fees. Therefore, the Court vacated the fee award and remanded the case to the superior court to afford the father an opportunity to respond to the insurer’s motion for reasonable attorney’s fees. View "Bush v. Elkins" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from the liquidation of Ambassador Insurance Company, Inc., a property and casualty insurance company incorporated in Vermont. Appellant National Indemnity Company (NICO), assignee to two claims under excess liability policies issued by Ambassador, appealed a superior court order setting a deadline by which all policyholders must file final proofs of claim. NICO argued that the final claim date did not strike a reasonable balance between the need to wind up the liquidation and the rights of policyholders with unliquidated claims. NICO contended that because Ambassador was then solvent, the liquidator could continue to cover all costs of administration in addition to paying claims and immediate closure of the liquidation was therefore not warranted. Closure at this time, NICO argued, would deny payment to higher-priority creditors in favor of lower-priority creditors, contrary to the policy in insolvency proceedings of protecting the rights of policyholders. The primary issue on appeal is not whether the trial court had the legal authority to set a final claim date; the question was whether, given the unique circumstances of this case, the trial court erred in setting December 31, 2013 as a final date for submission of proofs of liquidated claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's final claim date indeed did not strike a "reasonable balance between the expeditious completion of the liquidation and the protection of unliquidated and undetermined claims." When determining whether a final claim date achieves this reasonable balance, courts should consider, among other factors: (1) the company's remaining assets; (2) the nature and amount of its remaining liabilities; (3) the administration costs of the estate; and (4) the extent to which delay in termination of the liquidation proceedings results in a delay of full payment to priority claim holders. Here, these factors weighed against the final claim date of December 31, 2013 set by the trial court. View "In re Ambassador Insurance Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Visteon, a worldwide manufacturer headquartered in Michigan, sued National Union, from which it had purchased liability insurance between 2000 and 2002. The policy excluded liability resulting from pollution caused by Visteon, except liability arising from a “Completed Operations Hazard.” In 2001, the toxic solvent TCE that was used to clean machinery in Visteon’s Connersville, Indiana plant was discovered to have leaked into the soil and groundwater. Neighboring landowners sued Visteon. National Union has refused to indemnify or defend. Indiana does not enforce standard pollution-exclusion clauses. Michigan law does enforce the more general kind of pollution-exclusion clause found in the policy. The district court ruled that Michigan law governed and held that Visteon was not entitled to coverage under the Completed Operations Hazard clause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The risk materialized in Indiana, but that could not have been foreseen. The Indiana victims were compensated by Visteon, and it is unclear what benefit the state would have derived from reimbursement of Visteon’s costs by National Union.” The court rejected Visteon’s argument that its “work” was “completed” each time a contract to supply products made at the plant was performed and concluded that the exception did not apply. View "Visteon Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh" on Justia Law

McMillin was general contractor and B&B Framing was a subcontractor in construction contracts for Temecula residential real estate development projects. ASIC issued B&B's commercial general liability insurance. Homeowners sued, alleging construction defects in their residences (Baker litigation). McMillin tendered the defense to ASIC, contending it was an additional insured. ASIC denied the tender. Later, McMillin-related entities (not McMillin) sued ASIC and other insurers, alleging that each was an insurer to subcontractors on the projects, that each was an additional insured under each policy, that each insurer owed each plaintiff a duty to defend the litigation, and that, by denying defense of the litigation each breached a contract of insurance and its implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Pretrial rulings resulted in agreement that, although ASIC had breached its duty to defend, the settlement proceeds ($690,154) would be applied as an offset to McMillin's Baker fees ($309,957), so that McMillin could not prove any contract damages, and without contract damages, McMillin could not maintain a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The parties stipulated to judgment in favor of ASIC. The court of appeal dismissed the appeal as to all parties other than McMillin and ASIC and reversed View "McMillin Co., LLC v. Am.. Safety Indem. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a breach of contract claim against Zenith after Santana Morales, Jr. was crushed to death by a palm tree while working as a landscaper for Lawns. The Florida Supreme Court answered the following certified questions in the affirmative: (1) Does the estate have standing to bring its breach of contract claim against Zenith under the employer liability policy? (2) If so, does the provision in the employer liability policy which excludes from coverage "any obligation imposed by workers' compensation... law" operate to exclude coverage of the estate's claim against Zenith for the tort judgment? and (3) If the estate's claim is not barred by the workers' compensation exclusion, does the release in the workers' compensation settlement agreement otherwise prohibit the estate's collection of the tort judgment? The court concluded that, given the Florida Supreme Court's resolution of the certified issues, the district court correctly determined that the workers' compensation exclusion in Part II of the policy barred Zenith's coverage of the tort judgment against Lawns. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Zenith. View "Morales v. Zenith Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 1997, Dr. Michael Hayes and Dr. Michael Taillon were working as emergency room physicians at Providence Hospital, presumably as independent contractors. Arthur Sharpe came to the Providence Hospital emergency room complaining of chest pain. Dr. Hayes and Dr. Taillon evaluated Sharpe and diagnosed him as suffering from reflux. Sharpe was discharged. Sharpe had actually suffered a heart attack, which was determined a few days later when he sought further medical care elsewhere. Because of the misdiagnosis, in 1999, Sharpe and his wife filed a medical malpractice and loss of consortium action against Providence Hospital and Dr. Hayes. The Sharpes did not name Dr. Taillon as a defendant. Providence Hospital settled with the Sharpes in 2004. In 2007, Providence Hospital filed this equitable indemnification action against Dr. Taillon and his medical malpractice insurer, The South Carolina Medical Malpractice Liability Joint Underwriting Association (collectively Respondents). Respondents moved for summary judgment on the ground that the medical malpractice statute of repose barred Providence Hospital's claim and the circuit court granted the motion on that basis. Providence Hospital appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the medical malpractice statute of repose applied to Providence Hospital's indemnity claim. The Court concluded that Providence Hospital's indemnity action was indeed barred by the statute of repose, and as such affirmed the trial court. View "Columbia/CSA-HS Greater Columbia Healthcare System v. So. Carolina Medical Malpractice Liability Joint Underwriting Association" on Justia Law