Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

DAFCO LLC sought recovery against Stewart Title Guaranty Co. on a lender's title insurance policy and against AmeriTitle, Inc., the closing agent for the lending transaction, claiming that it sustained injury as a result of a defective deed of trust. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Stewart and AmeriTitle, resulting in this appeal by DAFCO. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "DAFCO v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co" on Justia Law

In 2010, Idaho Power entered into two Firm Energy Sales Agreements, one with New Energy Two, LLC, and the other with New Energy Three, LLC, under which Idaho Power agreed to purchase electricity from them that was to be generated by the use of biogas. The agreement with New Energy Two stated that the project would be operational on October 1, 2012, and the agreement with New Energy Three stated that the project would be operational on December 1, 2012. Both contracts were submitted for approval to the Idaho Public Utilities Commission, and were both approved on July 1, 2010. Each of the agreements contained a force majeure clause. By written notice, New Energy Two and New Energy Three informed Idaho Power that they were claiming the occurrence of a force majeure event, which was ongoing proceedings before the Public Utilities Commission. New Energy asserted that until those proceedings were finally resolved "the entire circumstance of continued viability of all renewable energy projects in Idaho is undecided"and that as a consequence "renewable energy project lenders are unwilling to lend in Idaho pending the outcome of these proceedings."Idaho Power filed petitions with the Commission against New Energy Two and New Energy Three seeking declaratory judgments that no force majeure event, as that term was defined in the agreements, had occurred and that Idaho Power could terminate both agreements for the failure of the projects to be operational by the specified dates. New Energy filed a motion to dismiss both petitions on the ground that the Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction to interpret or enforce contracts. After briefing from both parties, the Commission denied New Energy's motion to dismiss. The Commission's order was an interlocutory order that is not appealable as a matter of right. New Energy filed a motion with the Supreme Court requesting a permissive appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 12, and the Court granted the motion. New Energy then appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's order.View "Idaho Power v. New Energy Two" on Justia Law

Dick McClary submitted an application for health insurance to Golden Rule Insurance Company that failed to disclose proposed insured Patti Denney’s preexisting condition. Golden Rule issued a policy covering Denney, but later denied coverage for a proposed surgery based on the fact that the conditions documented in Denney’s medical records were not disclosed in her insurance application. The Kansas Insurance Department imposed sanctions on Golden Rule for unfair claim settlement practices, concluding that Golden Rule had wrongfully denied Denney coverage for a medically necessary procedure. The district court affirmed. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that McClary was not acting as Golden Rule’s soliciting agent when he submitted Denney’s health insurance application. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the court of appeals’ decision on the agency question, as substantial evidence supported the conclusion that McClary had the actual authority to solicit and submit applications directly to Golden Rule; and (2) reversed the Department and the district court on their ruling that Golden Rule violated Kan. Stat. Ann. 40-2404(9)(f) but affirmed the finding of a violation of subsection (d); and (3) affirmed the Department’s remedy.View "Golden Rule Ins. Co. v. Tomlinson" on Justia Law

When Monsanto Company sued Mitchell Scruggs and his various agricultural entities for patent infringement in federal court, Scruggs made a demand on his commercial general liability insurer, Farmland Mutual Insurance Company. Farmland denied coverage based on Scruggs's alleged intentional conduct. Scruggs then sued Farmland, Greg Bost (the insurance agent), and Nowell Insurance Agency in state court. The circuit court ultimately granted summary judgment for Bost and Nowell. Scruggs appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court, arguing, among other things, that Bost and Nowell negligently failed to advise him that he needed to purchase patent infringement insurance. Because the Supreme Court found Scruggs's conduct was uninsurable as a matter of law, it affirmed.View "Scruggs v. Bost" on Justia Law

The Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Arch Specialty Insurance Company, finding that Arch's general liability policy did not provide coverage for the claims asserted by the wrongful death beneficiaries of William Gray. The Grays' claimed negligent hiring, negligent training, and failure to implement appropriate triage protocols arose from the performance of or failure to perform medical services, against Arch's insured. The Grays appealed. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "Gray v. Arch Specialty Insurance Company" on Justia Law

An Employer appealed from a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commission (Commission) ordering Employer to pay additional temporary total disability benefits to Employee, who was injured during his employment. After a jury trial, the trial court granted Employee’s motion for judgment and affirmed the award, concluding that the Commission decision was a piece of evidence that needed to be considered by the jury and that Employer was required to introduce the Commission decision into evidence. The court of special appeals reversed, concluding that Appellant was not required to move the award into evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, in a de novo workers’ compensation jury trial, the appellant is not required to move the Commission decision into evidence.View "Gales v. Sunoco & Amer. Zurich Ins." on Justia Law

Crystal Harrington was injured in a single-car accident while riding as a passenger in a car owned by her father but driven by Joey Williams, a non-family member. The vehicle was insured by Travelers Commercial Insurance Company (Travelers), but the vehicle was excluded from uninsured motorist (UM) coverage pursuant to a “family vehicle exclusion” provision in the policy. Williams was underinsured, and the liability payments from Williams’ insurer, when combined with payments under Harrington’s policy, did not fully cover Harrington’s medical costs. Therefore, Harrington sought UM benefits from Travelers, which denied the claim. Harrington sued Travelers, seeking payment of stacked UM benefits, despite the fact that her mother, the named insured and purchaser of the policy, had expressly selected non-stacking UM coverage. The trial court granted summary judgment for Harrington, concluding (1) the policy provision excluding family vehicles from UM coverage was invalid because it conflicted with Fla. Stat. 627.727(3); and (2) Harrington’s mother’s election of non-stacking UM coverage did not apply to Harrington. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a family vehicle exclusion in an automobile insurance policy does not conflict with section 627.727(3); and (2) UM benefits are not stackable under section 627.727(9) if the named insured or purchaser of the policy made a non-stacking election.View "Travelers Commercial Ins. Co. v. Harrington" on Justia Law

Petitioners, family members of victims of state sponsored terrorism, sought enforcement of their 2010 judgment obtained against North Korea by attaching the blocked assets of that state under section 201 of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA), 28 U.S.C. 1610 note, and sections 1610(f)(1) and 1610(g) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1610(f)(1) and 1610(g). Petitioners sought to satisfy their judgments from electronic fund transfers (EFTs) blocked in United States banks pursuant to the sanctions regimes imposed upon North Korea by the United States government. The court concluded that petitions may not attach the EFTs at issue under section 201(a) of the TRIA because their judgment was not issued against a terrorist party. In regard to claims under section 1610(g)(1) of the FSIA , the court remanded in order for the parties to conduct discovery aimed at resolving the factual issues surrounding whether the entities that transmitted the EFTs to respondents banks were agencies or instrumentalities of North Korea. In regards to claims under section 1610(f)(1) of the FSIA, the court held that petitioners' claim for relief pursuant to that statutory provision is without merit for the simple reason that a party's right to proceed under that section was eliminated by a valid executive order that no subsequent presidential administration has rescinded. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.View "Calderon-Cardona v. BNY Mellon et al." on Justia Law

An Insurer issued a life insurance policy to an Insured. After the Insured died, the Insurer refused to pay the death benefit to Plaintiff, the Insured’s widow, and rescinded the life insurance policy based on its discovery that the Insured had failed to disclose that he had undergone certain medical procedures. Plaintiff sued the Insurer and the medical records contractor from whom the Insurer requested the Insured’s medical records. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants, concluding (1) the Insured’s failure to disclose the medical procedures made his statements willfully false or intentionally misleading as a matter of law; and (2) a patient does not have a cause of action under Minn. Stat. 144.298(2) for withholding a medical record that the patient authorized to be released. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) rescission of a life insurance policy requires proof of the insured’s subjective intent to deceive, and there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the intent of the Insured in this case; and (2) a patient does not have a private right of action under section 144.298(2) when a person releases fewer medical records than authorized by a patient’s consent.View "Larson v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Berrey was injured in an automobile accident at work. The at‐fault driver, who did not work with Berrey, carried liability insurance, but the cost of Berrey’s injuries exceeded the policy’s limit. Berrey received partial compensation under her employer’s workers’ compensation scheme but, because her employer was not responsible for the accident, state law granted the workers’ compensation carrier a lien on any recovery from the at‐fault driver. The at‐fault driver’s insurer paid its full policy limit directly to the workers’ compensation carrier. Travelers provided underinsured motorist coverage to Berrey’s employer. The policy covered an employee injured by a third-party who did not carry adequate auto insurance to fully compensate for the employee’s loss. Travelers paid Berrey the difference between her total calculated damages and the at‐fault driver’s policy limit. Berrey claims that Travelers improperly deducted the at-fault driver’s insurance payment from the total it owed to Berrey because that payment was made directly to the workers’ compensation carrier rather than to Berrey herself. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Travelers. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the language of the policy supported Travelers’s calculation and that Berrey’s reading would undermine the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage.View "Berrey v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am." on Justia Law