Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff and the Estate of John Green appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Church Mutual. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that coverage for the injuries plaintiffs suffered because of their exposure to carbon monoxide was precluded by the pollution exclusions contained in the relevant policies where the court held that the Nebraska Supreme Court would conclude that carbon monoxide constituted a "pollutant" under the policies. The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of plaintiffs' expert. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in rejecting plaintiffs' estoppel claim where the insured suffered no actual prejudice or harm as a result of Church Manual's delay in reserving its rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Church Mutual Ins. Co. v. Green, et al." on Justia Law

An Insured obtained an insurance policy to reimburse its expenses in regaining control of an oil well in the event the well blew out. The well subsequently blew out and caught fire. The Insured represented to the Insurer that it owed 100 percent working interest in the well, andthe Insurer paid claims accordingly. After the Insurer discovered that the Insured might have possessed less than 100 percent working interest in the well, the Insurer filed a lawsuit for a return of its payments under breach of contract and equity claims. The court of appeals entered summary judgment in favor of the Insurer on its equity claims, but a different court of appeals overturned the prior rulings, concluding that the Insurer had no equitable right to reimbursement. The Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that the Insurer could not proceed on its equity claims but for different reasons, holding that because the insurance contract addressed the Insured’s conduct, the Insurer could not rely on its equity claims. Remanded to the court of appeals to address the contract claims. View "Gotham Ins. Co. v. Warren E&P, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant was severely injured in an automobile collision in Kentucky while driving a truck for Miller Pipeline Corporation. Appellant received workers’ compensation benefits and settled with the tortfeasor and then sought to recover the remainder of his damages from underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage in Miller’s policy with Zurich American Insurance Company. Zurich denied coverage because Miller had allegedly rejected UIM coverage in Kentucky. The trial court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of Zurich, concluding that the inclusion of UIM coverage in the policy was a mutual mistake by Miller and Zurich. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the doctrine of mutual mistake was erroneously applied by the courts below. Remanded for an order granting Appellant’s motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of UIM coverage. View "Nichols v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured in an accident while driving a business vehicle owned by Mattress King, Inc. and insured by Mountain West Farm Bureau. Plaintiff, whose personal vehicles were insured by Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois, filed a claim with Safeco for medical payment benefits. Plaintiff received medical payment benefits from Safeco and an undisclosed amount of underinsured motorist benefits from Mountain West. Believing Safeco wrongfully refused to pay additional claimed benefits, Plaintiff brought a class action suit against Safeco. The district court ultimately ruled in favor of Safeco. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the “other insurance” clauses in Plaintiff’s automobile liability policy were valid and, as applied in this case, did not constitute de facto subrogation. View "Scheafer v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ill." on Justia Law

Netherlands filed suit against Main Street, seeking a declaratory judgment as to whether Netherlands had a duty to defend or indemnify Main Street in the underlying lawsuit with Malt-O-Meal. The court concluded that, because Main Street did not intentionally sell to Malt-O-Meal FDA-condemnable dried milk, the sale of FDA-condemnable dried milk was an "accident" that constituted an "occurrence" under the policy; the district court properly concluded that the "your product" exclusion did not apply because the property damage claimed was to Malt-O-Meal's product, not Main Street's product; the district court correctly found the impaired property exclusion did not apply where the instant oatmeal was not "impaired property" because it could not "be restored to use" and where the instant oatmeal was "physically injured;" and construing the recall exclusion "strictly against the insurer," the court concluded that the district court correctly found that the exclusion did not apply. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment where Main Street's loss was covered under the policy and no exclusions applied. View "The Netherlands Ins. Co. v. Main Street Ingredients, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellee AGCO Corporation (AGCO) manufactured and sold a self-propelled, agricultural spray applicator called the "RoGator." In 2005, AGCO began offering an Extended Protection Plan (EPP) to its RoGator customers. Appellant Lloyd’s Syndicate No. 5820 d/b/a Cassidy Davis provided the master policy of insurance for the EPP program, which covered AGCO for certain liability to customers who purchased the RoGator EPP. Glynn General Corporation administered the plans. Between 2005 and 2008, AGCO enrolled about 2,050 RoGator machines in the EPP program. In 2008, a number of customers presented claims under the EPP based on the failure of wheel motors on the RoGator. After it paid about 25 claims related to this failure, Cassidy Davis invoked the "Epidemic Failure Clause" of the master insurance policy and refused to pay for any more claims. AGCO then sued Cassidy Davis asserting various claims, namely claims for breach of contract and bad faith denial of insurance coverage. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to AGCO and denied partial summary judgment to Cassidy Davis on a breach of contract issue, holding that the EPP covered failures caused by design and engineering defects in the RoGators. The trial court also denied Cassidy Davis’s motion for summary judgment on the bad faith claim, rejecting the insurer’s argument that it was not obligated to indemnify AGCO until a court entered a judgment establishing AGCO’s legal liability to its customers. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court on both issues. Cassidy Davis appealed, arguing: (1) that the Court of Appeals erred in its interpretation of the coverage provision of the extended protection plan; and (2) the Court of Appeals erred in its interpretation of the indemnity provision of the master policy of liability insurance. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals misinterpreted the relevant language of both contracts. Therefore the Court reversed on both issues. View "Lloyd's Syndicate No. 5820 v. AGCO Corporation" on Justia Law

The Colorado Division of Insurance initiated an investigation into Milton Trujillo's application to renew as a insurance producer license with bail bond authority. It later denied the application based on a complaint it received. The Division charged Trujillo with twelve counts of violating the insurance code, professions and occupations code, and Division regulations. The ALJ revoked the license; the Commissioner of Insurance adopted the ALJ's decision. The court of appeals affirmed the Commissioner's action, determining that Trujillo violated a fiduciary duty prescribed by 10-2-704(a). The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the court of appeals erred in applying section 10-2-704(1)(a) to this case: "[w]hile there are unappealed findings of fact upon which the Commissioner on remand could uphold the sanction it ordered, it is not clear [to the Court] whether, absent the agency's construction of 10-2-704(1)(a), the Commissioner would have exercised his authority to revoke Trujillo's license and deny his renewal application." The case was therefore remanded for redetermination by the Commissioner the appropriate sanction for Trujillo's conduct. View "Trujillo v. Colorado Division of Insurance" on Justia Law

A worker was left a paraplegic after a 1976 work-related motor vehicle accident. He suffered a number of medical complications related to his injuries. In 2007, his employer controverted some aspects of his medical care, and he filed a written workers’ compensation claim. Shortly before the hearing on the claim, the employer withdrew most of its controversions. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board decided that some of the controversions were frivolous, unfair, or in bad faith. It imposed a statutory penalty and reported its findings about frivolous or unfair controversions to the Alaska Division of Insurance. The employer appealed, and the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission reversed the Board in part, deciding as a matter of law that the Board could not impose a penalty for some of the controversions. The Commission decided that other appeal points were moot. The worker appeals the Commission’s decision reversing the penalties and some attorney’s fees; the employer cross-appeals the Commission’s decisions about preservation of the controversion issues and mootness. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's decision that the controversion issue was properly before the Board, but reversed regarding the penalties issue. View "Harris v. M-K Rivers" on Justia Law

Jonathan Quinn and his family were residential tenants of Barker & Little, Inc., when Quinn’s daughter was diagnosed with lead poisoning, Quinn sued Barker & Little for the injuries his daughter sustained from the high concentrations of lead in the leased premises. Barker & Little tendered the claim to Farmers Insurance Exchange (Farmers) and Truck Insurance Exchange (Truck). Farmers declined to defend Barker & Little under the applicable insurance policies. After a trial, the circuit court rendered judgment for Quinn. Quinn then asserted standing to bring all claims against Farmers and Truck that otherwise could have been brought by Barker & Little. Farmers and Truck moved for summary judgment on the basis of exclusions in the applicable policies. The circuit court granted the motion, concluding that Farmers had no duty to defend or indemnify Barker & Little in the underlying action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed that precluded summary judgment in this case. View "Quinn v. Farmers Ins. Exch." on Justia Law

An underinsured motorist collided with a city bus driven by Plaintiff. Plaintiff received a net workers’ compensation award of $71,958. Plaintiff also received $25,000 from the tortfeasor’s insurer. Plaintiff carried an underinsured (UM) policy issued by American Family Mutual Insurance Company that provided coverage up to $50,000 per person. Plaintiff submitted a UM claim to American Family, which denied coverage. Plaintiff filed a breach of contract action against American Family, asserting that he was entitled, under the terms of the policy, to $25,000 - the difference between his UM policy limit of $50,000 and the $25,000 he received from the tortfeasor’s insurer. The trial court granted summary judgment for American Family, concluding that the workers’ compensation benefits Plaintiff received operated as a setoff against the policy limit, thus reducing American Family’s liability to zero. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the policy language unambiguously provided for a setoff against the policy limit; but (2) because this particular set-off would reduce the policy limit below the statutory minimum, Plaintiff was entitled to recover the remaining $25,000 from American Family. View "Justice v. Am. Family Ins. Co." on Justia Law