Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

Fiorentini is the owner and president of a small technology company. When cancer treatment left him unable to perform his job, he received total disability benefits under a Paul Revere policy. Five years later, after Fiorentini was back at work and exercising full control of the company, Paul Revere notified him that he no longer qualified for the benefits. Fiorentini argued that he still satisfied the policy’s requirements for total disability because, although he could perform most of his job duties, he was unable to do what it takes to generate new business. Paul Revere rejected that argument, encouraging him to apply for “residual disability benefits,” which would have required Fiorentini to show that he was either unable to perform “one or more of the important duties” of his occupation or could only perform his important job duties for “80% of the time normally required to perform them” and that he earned at least 20% less than he did predisability. Fiorentini instead sued for breach of contract. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Paul Revere. The total disability provision does not cover the insured who has a diminished ability to perform his occupation, but rather the insured who is unable to continue it. View "Fiorentini v. Paul Revere Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

At age 56, Newman purchased a long-term-care insurance plan MetLife, opting for one of MetLife’s non-standard options for paying her insurance premiums, “Reduced-Pay-at 65.” From the outset, Newman paid the elevated premium associated with her Reduced-Pay option. When she reached age 65, her premium was cut in half. When Newman was 67 years old, she was startled to discover that MetLife that year more than doubled her insurance premium. The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of Newman’s proposed class action, alleging breach of contract, deceptive and unfair business practices, and common-law fraud. The allegations raised in the complaint were enough to entitle Newman to prevail on the liability phase of her contract claim and to go forward on her remaining claims. The policy language is at least ambiguous, because it can be read reasonably to fix a person’s premium, if she had opted for the Reduced-Pay option. Illinois construes ambiguous contracts against the insurer. Newman’s complaint also alleged facts that plausibly show that MetLife’s policy was both deceptive and unfair under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act and adequately alleged fraudulent concealment and reasonable reliance. View "Newman v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co" on Justia Law

At age 56, Newman purchased a long-term-care insurance plan MetLife, opting for one of MetLife’s non-standard options for paying her insurance premiums, “Reduced-Pay-at 65.” From the outset, Newman paid the elevated premium associated with her Reduced-Pay option. When she reached age 65, her premium was cut in half. When Newman was 67 years old, she was startled to discover that MetLife that year more than doubled her insurance premium. The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of Newman’s proposed class action, alleging breach of contract, deceptive and unfair business practices, and common-law fraud. The allegations raised in the complaint were enough to entitle Newman to prevail on the liability phase of her contract claim and to go forward on her remaining claims. The policy language is at least ambiguous, because it can be read reasonably to fix a person’s premium, if she had opted for the Reduced-Pay option. Illinois construes ambiguous contracts against the insurer. Newman’s complaint also alleged facts that plausibly show that MetLife’s policy was both deceptive and unfair under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act and adequately alleged fraudulent concealment and reasonable reliance. View "Newman v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co" on Justia Law

Hyland was a passenger in a car owned by Perkins and driven by Smith, age 16. Smith smashed the car into two parked vehicles, seriously injuring Hyland. Smith was convicted of aggravated reckless driving. Neither Smith nor her parents had auto insurance. Perkins had insurance with Liberty Mutual, covering her family, including her daughter Risby and anyone driving the car with the family’s permission. Smith told Liberty Mutual that Risby gave her the keys during a party; Risby denied doing that and said that she gave the keys to “Rob,” who was never identified. The police reported that Smith told many incompatible stories. Liberty Mutual would not provide a defense or indemnity. Smith defaulted. A state court entered a $4.6 million judgment. Smith assigned to Hyland whatever claim she had against Liberty Mutual. The district court concluded that Liberty Mutual’s failure either to defend or to seek a declaratory judgment of non-coverage violated Illinois law, making it liable for the entire judgment, although the policy provided only $25,000 per person in coverage. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for the entry of a judgment for $25,000 plus interest; damages for a breach of the duty to defend are measured by the consequences proximately caused by the breach. The maximum loss caused by this failure to defend is $25,000 View "Hyland v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Hyland was a passenger in a car owned by Perkins and driven by Smith, age 16. Smith smashed the car into two parked vehicles, seriously injuring Hyland. Smith was convicted of aggravated reckless driving. Neither Smith nor her parents had auto insurance. Perkins had insurance with Liberty Mutual, covering her family, including her daughter Risby and anyone driving the car with the family’s permission. Smith told Liberty Mutual that Risby gave her the keys during a party; Risby denied doing that and said that she gave the keys to “Rob,” who was never identified. The police reported that Smith told many incompatible stories. Liberty Mutual would not provide a defense or indemnity. Smith defaulted. A state court entered a $4.6 million judgment. Smith assigned to Hyland whatever claim she had against Liberty Mutual. The district court concluded that Liberty Mutual’s failure either to defend or to seek a declaratory judgment of non-coverage violated Illinois law, making it liable for the entire judgment, although the policy provided only $25,000 per person in coverage. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for the entry of a judgment for $25,000 plus interest; damages for a breach of the duty to defend are measured by the consequences proximately caused by the breach. The maximum loss caused by this failure to defend is $25,000 View "Hyland v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Thorne has a property insurance policy with Member Select, which denied his claim for coverage after his Griffith, Indiana house burned down in 2008. Thorne chose not to rebuild the house and Member Select determined that either Thorne or his brother, who also lived in the house, intentionally set the fire. A jury awarded Thorne $87,000. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find that Thorne was a resident of the house, as required for recovery under the policy and for the jury to determine damages. The court also rejected an argument that the district court misinterpreted the policy’s loss coverage provision in evaluating whether the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s damages award. View "Thorne v. MemberSelect Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In this action challenging an insurance company’s doubling of Plaintiff’s insurance premium, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim, holding that Plaintiff was entitled to relief on her contract claim and that the allegations Plaintiff raised were enough to permit her to go forward on her other theories.When Plaintiff was sixty-seven years old, she discovered that Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife) more than doubled her insurance premium. Plaintiff brought this lawsuit against MetLife on behalf of herself and a proposed class, alleging breach of contract, deceptive and unfair business practices, and common-law fraud. The district court granted MetLife’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, concluding that the insurance policy unambiguously permitted MetLife to raise Plaintiff’s premium. The First Circuit disagreed, holding that the allegations raised in the complaint were enough to entitle Plaintiff to prevail on the liability phase of her contract claim and to go forward on her remaining claims. View "Newman v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Risk retention groups (RRGs) insure only their owners. The Products Liability Risk Retention Act encourages manufacturers to pool their resources into RRGs and explicitly preempts state laws that inhibit the formation of RRGs. The subsequent Liability Risk Retention Act (LRRA) preempts any state law that would “make unlawful, or regulate, directly or indirectly, the operation of" an RRG, 15 U.S.C. 3902(a) and provides that only an RRG’s chartering state may regulate its formation and operation. If RRGs are “subject to that state’s insurance regulatory laws, including adequate rules and regulations allowing for complete financial examination of all books and records” they may operate in any state. Nonchartering states may require RRGs “to … demonstrate[e] financial responsibility" to obtain a license or permit to undertake specified activities but states are prohibited from “discriminating” against an out-of-state RRG. Restoration is a Vermont-chartered RRG for businesses that restore buildings after disasters. In Wisconsin, these businesses are regulated as “dwelling contractors” and must obtain an annual certificate of financial responsibility from the state Trades Credentialing Unit (TCU), by proof of a “policy of general liability insurance issued by an insurer authorized to do business in [Wisconsin].” Since 2006, Wisconsin dwelling contractors could meet this requirement by securing insurance from Restoration. In 2015, TCU changed its position so that none of Restoration’s Wisconsin shareholder‐insureds could rely on Restoration to satisfy the state liability insurance requirements. The Seventh Circuit vacated a judgment rejecting Restoration’s challenge to the ruling and remanded for a determination of whether intervening amendments to the statute render the litigation moot. View "Restoration Risk Retention Group, Inc. v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

After the Garcias bought their Lake Station Property in 2004, it was used as an automobile repair shop and a day spa. It previously was used as a dry cleaning facility and contained six underground storage tanks: four were used for petroleum-based Stoddard solvent, one was used for gasoline, and the last for heating oil. In 1999, the dry cleaning company reported a leak from the Stoddard tanks to the Indiana Department of Environmental Management (IDEM). In 2000, a site investigation was conducted and five groundwater monitoring wells were installed. IDEM requested additional information and testing in 2001 and 2004. The Garcias claim they had no knowledge of the preexisting environmental contamination before insuring with Atlantic. A 2014 letter from Environmental Inc. brought the contamination to the Garcias’ attention. The Garcias hired Environmental to investigate and learned that Perchloroethylene solvent and heating oil still affected the property. Atlantic obtained a declaration that its Commercial General Liability Coverage (CGL) policies did not apply. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reading a “Claims in Process” exclusion to preclude coverage for losses or claims for damages arising out of property damage—known or unknown—that occurred or was in the process of occurring before the policy’s inception. View "Atlantic Casualty Insurance Co v. Garcia" on Justia Law

West Side was working on ConAgra’s grain bin when it exploded. In 2014, the Seventh Circuit held that West Side was solely liable for the injuries that workers suffered in the explosion and was liable for $3 million in property damage to ConAgra’s bin. West Side had an $11 million excess insurance policy with RSUI. West Side sued, alleging that RSUI breached its duty to settle ConAgra’s property damage claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of RSUI. Under Illinois law, the damage-to-property clause excludes the claim from coverage. RSUI had no duty to settle a claim that the insurance policy does not cover. Holding otherwise would undermine the basic premise of the damage-to-property exclusion: that general liability policies are not intended to protect the insured from the normal risks of its business. The damage that West Side caused was one of the normal risks associated with its business of remedying hot grain bins before they explode. Even if West Side was only working on the grain when the explosion occurred, it is immaterial. The exclusion does not apply only to the precise area of the property being worked on if the work performed was poor. View "West Side Salvage, Inc. v. RSUI Indemnity Co." on Justia Law