Justia Insurance Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Contracts
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A general contractor, Keluco General Contractors, Inc., secured a workers’ compensation and employers’ liability policy through Travelers Property Casualty Company of America. The policy was set to last one year, expiring on March 5, 2017. After the policy expired, a Keluco employee was injured at work. Keluco attempted to make a claim on its workers’ compensation policy and discovered it had expired. Travelers claimed to have sent a notice of nonrenewal to Keluco and its insurance agent, Gretchen Santerre, but Keluco claimed it never received the notice.Keluco sued Santerre and her employer, Country Mutual Insurance Company, for failing to inform it of the nonrenewal notice. Santerre filed a third-party complaint against Travelers. The Superior Court of Alaska granted partial summary judgment against Travelers, ruling that it failed to send the nonrenewal notice in the manner required by statute, specifically by not obtaining a certificate of mailing from the United States Postal Service (USPS). The court found that Travelers breached its contract with Keluco.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. The court affirmed the Superior Court’s rulings on summary judgment, agreeing that Travelers violated AS 21.36.260 by not obtaining a certificate of mailing from USPS and thus breached its contract with Keluco. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Travelers’ contribution claim against Santerre, noting that Alaska law allows for the allocation of fault to a party who has settled out of a case.However, the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court’s determination of when prejudgment interest began to accrue. The Supreme Court held that prejudgment interest should begin to accrue on September 20, 2017, the date the Keluco employee was injured and entitled to workers’ compensation benefits, rather than January 9, 2017. The case was remanded for recalculation of prejudgment interest. View "Travelers Property Casualty Company of America v. Keluco General Contractors" on Justia Law

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Tody's Service, Inc. (Tody's), a towing company, billed Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty) a six-figure storage fee after towing and storing a vehicle involved in a fatal crash at the direction of the police. The vehicle, insured by Liberty, was held as evidence for nearly three years. After obtaining the vehicle's title, Liberty refused to pay the accrued storage charges, leading Tody's to sue Liberty to recover those fees.In the Superior Court, a judge granted summary judgment in favor of Liberty on all of Tody's claims, which included unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel, and failure to pay storage fees under G. L. c. 159B, § 6B. The judge found no evidence of unjust enrichment, ruled that § 6B does not provide a private right of action, and concluded that Tody's failed to demonstrate any actionable promise or reasonable reliance to support promissory estoppel.The Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and held that Liberty was not unjustly enriched as a matter of law, as there was no measurable benefit conferred on Liberty by Tody's storage of the vehicle. The court also found no evidence of reliance sufficient to support promissory estoppel, as Tody's stored the vehicle in response to a police directive, not in reliance on any promise by Liberty. Additionally, the court held that § 6B does not create a private right of action against a vehicle owner. Consequently, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment in Liberty's favor. View "Tody's Service, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company" on Justia Law

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In this case, a construction financer, Mortgages Ltd. (ML), collapsed, leading to numerous mechanics' liens on unfinished projects. ML had loaned $165 million to Tempe Land Company (TLC) for a condominium project, securing the loan with a deed of trust and purchasing a title insurance policy from Fidelity National Title Insurance Company. Contractors began recording mechanics' liens against the property, and ML entered involuntary bankruptcy. The Loan LLCs, created to hold ML's assets, foreclosed on the property but did not extinguish the liens. Universal and VRCP provided loans to ML Manager and the Loan LLCs, securing their loans with deeds of trust and obtaining title insurance policies from Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co.The trial court granted summary judgment to Commonwealth on CMLC's breach of contract claim, finding that the loans were fully repaid, thus precluding coverage under the policy. The case proceeded to trial on CMLC's bad faith claim, where the jury awarded $5 million in damages. Both parties appealed. The court of appeals vacated the trial court's summary judgment on the breach of contract claim, directing the trial court to enter summary judgment for CMLC, and affirmed the denial of Commonwealth's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the bad faith claim.The Supreme Court of Arizona reviewed the case and held that Commonwealth could contest coverage based on policy provisions limiting liability to the unpaid indebtedness. The court found that the loans were fully repaid, thus no covered loss occurred. The court also held that the diminution in lien value did not constitute actual pecuniary damage to support a bad faith claim. Additionally, the court ruled that the collateral source rule did not preclude evidence of loan repayments. The court vacated the court of appeals' opinion, affirmed the trial court's summary judgment for Commonwealth on the breach of contract claim, and remanded to enter summary judgment for Commonwealth on the bad faith claim. View "CENTERPOINT v COMMONWEALTH" on Justia Law

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BCC Partners, LLC ("BCC") contracted with Ben F. Blanton Construction, Inc. ("Blanton") to build an apartment complex in Creve Coeur, Missouri. Blanton obtained an insurance policy from Travelers Property Casualty Company of America ("Travelers"), naming Blanton as the "Named Insured" and BCC as an "Additional Named Insured." A retaining wall failure during construction led to damage and delays, resulting in multiple insurance claims. Travelers paid $1.3 million into an escrow account, which was divided among claimants. BCC later sought coverage for loss of rental income and soft costs due to the delays, but Travelers denied the claim after an initial advance payment of $200,000.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted summary judgment to Travelers, concluding that BCC was not entitled to the demanded payments under the Policy. BCC appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that under the plain meaning of the Policy, only a "Named Insured" is covered for losses of rental income and soft costs. BCC, as an "Additional Named Insured," did not qualify for such coverage. The court found that the Policy's language was clear and unambiguous, and BCC's arguments to the contrary were unavailing. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's judgment, ruling that Travelers did not breach the Policy and that BCC's claim for vexatious refusal to pay also failed. View "BCC Partners, LLC v. Travelers Property Casualty Co. of America" on Justia Law

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Daniel Jones signed a blank application for a homeowner’s insurance policy, trusting his agent, J. Kim Hatcher Insurance Agencies, Inc. (Hatcher), to complete it accurately. Jones relied on Hatcher’s assurance based on their prior dealings and the commission Hatcher would earn. After Hurricane Florence destroyed Jones’s home, his insurer refused to cover the losses, citing material misrepresentations in the application. Jones discovered that Hatcher had omitted the existence of a pond and understated the property size.Jones sued Hatcher for negligence and gross negligence, among other claims. Hatcher moved to dismiss the ordinary negligence claim under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing contributory negligence. The trial court granted Hatcher’s motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that dismissal was not warranted as the complaint did not necessarily defeat Jones’s claim for ordinary negligence. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the dismissal of Jones’s claim for punitive damages.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case. It agreed with the Court of Appeals that Jones’s complaint did not show contributory negligence as a matter of law, as the factual circumstances could support that Jones acted with ordinary prudence in trusting Hatcher. The court also found that Jones’s complaint sufficiently alleged a claim for punitive damages based on Hatcher’s willful and wanton conduct, giving Hatcher adequate notice of the claims. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision on the contributory negligence issue and reversed its decision on the punitive damages issue. View "Jones v. J. Kim Hatcher Ins. Agencies, Inc" on Justia Law

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Casey Cotton was involved in a car collision with Caleb and Adriane Crabtree, resulting in severe injuries to Caleb. The Crabtrees filed a lawsuit against Cotton and his insurer, Allstate, alleging that Allstate refused early settlement offers and failed to inform Cotton of these offers. While the claims against Allstate were dismissed, the claims against Cotton proceeded in the Lamar County Circuit Court. During the personal injury suit, Cotton declared bankruptcy, and his bankruptcy estate included a potential bad faith claim against Allstate. The Crabtrees, as unsecured creditors, petitioned the bankruptcy court to allow the personal injury suit to proceed to trial.The bankruptcy court directed that the suit against Cotton be liquidated by jury trial to pursue claims against Allstate for any resulting excess judgment. The Crabtrees sought an assignment of Cotton’s bad faith claim as a settlement of their unsecured claims in Cotton’s bankruptcy estate. Unable to afford the $10,000 up-front cost, they engaged Court Properties, LLC, to assist with financing. Court Properties paid the trustee $10,000 to acquire the bad faith claim, then assigned it to the Crabtrees in exchange for $10,000 plus interest, contingent on successful recovery from Allstate. Cotton was discharged from bankruptcy, and a jury verdict awarded the Crabtrees $4,605,000 in the personal injury suit.The Crabtrees filed an action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, which dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding the assignments champertous and void under Mississippi Code Section 97-9-11. The Crabtrees appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which certified a question to the Supreme Court of Mississippi.The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that Mississippi Code Section 97-9-11 prohibits a creditor in bankruptcy from engaging a disinterested third party to purchase a cause of action from a debtor. The court clarified that solicitation of a disinterested third party to prosecute a case in which it has no legitimate interest violates the statute. View "Crabtree v. Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company" on Justia Law

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Mullins Food Products, Inc. was sued in Illinois state court for violating the Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA). Mullins requested its liability insurer, Citizens Insurance Company of America, to defend the suit, but Citizens declined and instead filed a federal suit seeking a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Mullins based on exclusions in the commercial liability insurance policies issued to Mullins in 2015, 2016, and 2017. While the federal suit was pending, Mullins settled the state-court action.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois agreed with Citizens that the policy exclusions relieved Citizens of the duty to defend or indemnify Mullins. Specifically, the court found that the Access or Disclosure of Confidential or Personal Information exclusion and the Recording and Distribution of Material or Information in Violation of Law exclusion barred coverage for BIPA claims. The district court also ruled against Mullins on its counterclaim for breach of contract, reasoning that Citizens' timely filing of the declaratory judgment action precluded a finding of breach.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the district court's decision. The appellate court concluded that the Access or Disclosure exclusion in the 2016 and 2017 policies barred coverage for BIPA claims, but the Statutory Violations exclusion did not. Therefore, Citizens had a duty to defend and indemnify Mullins under the 2015 policy, assuming Mullins provided timely notice of the state-court action. The appellate court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the timeliness of Mullins' notice and to address Mullins' claim for reimbursement of defense costs. View "Citizens Insurance Company of America v Mullins Food Products, Inc." on Justia Law

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PorterCare Adventist Health Systems had inadequate surgical-sterilization procedures for about two years, leading to over $40 million in liability from thousands of patients' claims. PorterCare sought coverage from AdHealth, its excess-liability insurer, for the full $40 million policy limit, arguing that the claims arose from one medical incident. AdHealth refused coverage, asserting that a medical incident covers injuries to a single person, not multiple people, and filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment. PorterCare counterclaimed for declaratory judgment and breach of contract.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted summary judgment to AdHealth, agreeing with its interpretation that a medical incident is limited to the acts or omissions causing injury to one person. The court found that AdHealth owed coverage only for the claims of a single patient that trigger the excess policy’s liability threshold, not for multiple patients' claims grouped together.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the policy’s definition of “medical incident” unambiguously applies to the injuries of a single person. Therefore, AdHealth is liable only for individual claims exceeding PorterCare’s $2 million self-insurance retention, not for the aggregated claims of multiple patients. View "Adhealth, Limited v. PorterCare Adventist Health Systems" on Justia Law

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Kepali Group procured insurance for its fleet of vehicles through an agent at Brown & Brown of Florida, with Prime Property & Casualty Insurance Company issuing a commercial automobile policy for the period from January 23, 2019, to January 23, 2020. The policy included a provision for after-acquired vehicles, requiring notification within 30 days of acquisition for coverage. On December 6, 2019, a 2009 Toyota Sienna owned by Kepali was involved in an accident. Kepali had acquired the vehicle on September 30, 2019, and notified Brown to add it to the Prime policy. Prime issued a quote for the additional premium, but Kepali did not pay it, and Prime did not issue an endorsement for the vehicle.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ruled that Brown was acting as Kepali’s agent, not Prime’s, when attempting to procure insurance for the 3985 Toyota. However, the court concluded that the vehicle was covered under the policy’s after-acquired auto provision because Kepali met the two conditions: Prime covered all of Kepali’s vehicles, and Kepali notified Prime within 30 days of acquiring the vehicle. The court ruled that Prime had a duty to defend Kepali and Mr. Rodriguez but deferred ruling on the duty to indemnify until the underlying suit was resolved. The court granted summary judgment against Kepali and Mr. Rodriguez on their reformation and promissory estoppel claims and dismissed the remaining claims as moot.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The court held that the after-acquired auto provision did not require payment of an additional premium within 30 days for coverage to continue. The court also found that the premium audit provision allowed Prime to compute the final premium and bill Kepali, and that Prime failed to perform this audit or send a bill. Therefore, Prime could not terminate coverage for non-payment without following the policy’s cancellation procedures. The court concluded that Prime had a duty to defend Kepali and Mr. Rodriguez in the underlying state court action. View "Prime Property and Casualty Insurance Company v. Kepali Group, Inc." on Justia Law

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In 2005, Island Pointe, LLC contracted Complete Building Corporation (CBC) to construct a condominium project, Palmetto Pointe at Peas Island. CBC subcontracted Tri-County Roofing (TCR) for roofing and related work. In 2014-2015, Palmetto discovered construction defects and sued CBC, TCR, and others for negligence and breach of warranty. Palmetto received $6,800,000 in settlements, including $1,000,000 from CBC's insurer for a covenant-not-to-execute and $1,975,000 from four other defendants.The trial began in May 2019, and the jury found CBC and TCR liable for $6,500,000 in actual damages and $500,000 each in punitive damages. The trial court apportioned 5% liability to two other defendants, making CBC and TCR jointly and severally liable for the remaining 90% of actual damages. TCR sought setoff for the $1,000,000 payment and the settlements from the four other defendants. The trial court denied TCR's motion for setoff, except for partial amounts conceded by Palmetto.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case. It reversed the court of appeals' decision, holding that TCR is entitled to set off the full $1,000,000 paid by CBC's insurer. The court affirmed the lower court's decision regarding the settlements from Novus, Atlantic, H and A, and Cohen's, agreeing that the trial court reasonably allocated the settlement amounts. The case was remanded to the trial court for the calculation of the judgment against TCR. View "Palmetto Pointe v. Tri-County Roofing" on Justia Law